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Computability logic (CL) is a semantical platform and research program for redeveloping
logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which it
hasmore traditionally been. Formulas in CL stand for (interactive) computational problems,
understood as games between a machine and its environment; logical operators represent
operations on such entities; and “truth” is understood as existence of an effective solution,
i.e., of an algorithmic winning strategy.
The formalism of CL is open-ended, and may undergo series of extensions as the study
of the subject advances. The main groups of operators on which CL has been focused so far
are the parallel, choice, branching, and blind operators, with the logical behaviors of the ﬁrst
three groups resembling those of the multiplicatives, additives and exponentials of linear
logic, respectively. The present paper introduces a new important group of operators, called
sequential. The latter come in the formof sequential conjunction anddisjunction, sequential
quantiﬁers, and sequential recurrences (“exponentials”). As the name may suggest, the
algorithmic intuitions associated with this group are those of sequential computations, as
opposed to the intuitions of parallel computations associated with the parallel group of
operations. Speciﬁcally, while playing a parallel combination of games means playing all
components of the combination simultaneously, playing a sequential combination means
playing the components in a sequential fashion, one after one.
The main technical result of the present paper is a sound and complete axiomati-
zation of the propositional fragment of computability logic whose vocabulary, together
with negation, includes all three—parallel, choice and sequential—sorts of conjunction and
disjunction. An extension of this result to the ﬁrst-order level is also outlined.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This article is yet another addition to the evolving list [5–17] of papers devoted to developing computability logic (CL).
Baptized so in [5], in a broad sense, CL is not a particular syntactic system or a particular semantics for a particular collection
of logical operators, but rather a general platform and an ambitious program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory
of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which it has more traditionally been. Formulas in CL stand
for computational problems, logical operators represent operations on problems, “truth” is understood as existence of an
algorithmic solution, and proofs encode such solutions. Among the main goals of CL at the present stage of development is
ﬁnding axiomatizations for incrementally expressive fragments of it. Considerable advances have already been made in this
direction, and the present paper tells one more success story.
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The traditional theory of computation has been primarily evolving around batch computation, despite the fact of life that
most tasks performed by computers and computer networks (as well as humans in everyday life) are interactive. Aiming at
being a comprehensive formal theory of computation, CL understands computational problems and computability in their
most general—interactive—sense. And interactive problems are formalized as games played by a machine (computer, robot)
against its environment (user, nature), with computability meaning existence of a machine that wins the game against any
possible (behavior of the) environment.
Technically, the semantics of CL is thus a game semantics. Among the features distinguishing it from other game-
semantical approaches, including Blass’s approach [2,3] which is the closest precursor of computability logic, one should
point out the following.
First of all, in CL,machine’s (proponent’s, ∃-player’s) strategies are limited to algorithmic ones. This is aminimal condition
that a game semantics should satisfy if it is meant to ﬁnd applications in computer science. Due to the same condition, CL
has good—semantically rather than syntactically justiﬁed—claims to be a constructive logic.
Second, players’ strategies are no longer considered as functions from positions (the sequences of the previously made
moves) to moves. Rather, they are deﬁned in terms of interactive machines, where computation is one continuous process
interspersed with—and inﬂuenced by—multiple “input” (environment’s moves) and “output” (machine’s moves) events.
A good game semantics is or should be about interaction, while functions are inherently non-interactive. The traditional
strategies-as-functions approach misses this very important point and creates an unnatural hybrid of interactive (games)
and non-interactive (functions) entities. To appreciate the difference, it would be sufﬁcient to reﬂect on the behavior of
one’s personal computer. The job of your computer is to play one long—potentially inﬁnite—game against you. Now, have
you noticed your faithful servant getting slower every time you use it? Probably not. That is because the computer is smart
enough to follow a non-functional strategy in this game. If its strategy was a function from positions (interaction histories)
to moves, the response time would inevitably keep worsening due to the need to read the entire—continuously lengthening
and, in fact, practically inﬁnite—interaction history every time before responding. Deﬁning strategies as functions of only
the latest moves (rather than entire interaction histories) in Abramsky and Jagadeesan’s [1] tradition is also not a way out, as
typically more than just the last move matters. Back to your personal computer, its actions certainly depend on more than
your last keystroke. Thus, the difference between the traditional functional strategies and the post-functional strategies of
CL is not just a matter of taste or convenience. It will become especially important when it comes to (yet to be developed)
interactive complexity theory: hardly any meaningful interactive complexity theory can be done with the strategies-as-
functions approach. And complexity issues will inevitably come forward when computability logic or similar approaches
achieve a certain degree of maturity: nowadays, 95% of the theory of computation is about complexity rather than just
computability.
Third, the concept of games that CL deals with is more general than the traditional concepts. Among the distinguishing
features of CL games is the absence of procedural rules—rules regulating which player can or should move in any given
position, the most typical procedural rule being the one according to which the players take turns in an alternating order.
In CL games, both players may have legal moves in a given situation. It has been repeatedly argued that only this ﬂex-
ible approach allows us to adequately model truly interactive real-life computational tasks and account for phenomena
such as asynchronous communication, concurrency and parallelism. So, again, this difference is not just a difference of
tastes, and will certainly play a crucial role when it comes to interactive computational complexity and various ﬂavors
of it.
Timehasnotyetmatured for seriouslyaddressingcomplexity issues though, andCL, including thepresentpaper, continues
to be focused on just computability, where there still are too many open questions calling for answers.
The formalism of CL is open-ended, and is expected to undergo series of extensions as the study of the subject advances.
The main groups of operations studied so far are:
• Constant elementary games (0-ary operations): , ⊥.
• Negation: ¬.
• Choice operations:  (conjunction), unionsq (disjunction), (universal quantiﬁer),unionsq (existential quantiﬁer).
• Parallel operations: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction),∧ (universal quantiﬁer),∨ (existential quantiﬁer), ∧| (recurrence),
∨| (corecurrence).
• Blind operations: ∀ (universal quantiﬁer), ∃ (existential quantiﬁer).
• Branching operations: ◦| (recurrence), ◦| (corecurrence) and a series of their restricted versions such as ◦| ℵ0 (countable
recurrence),
◦| ℵ0 (countable corecurrence).
There are also various reduction operations: →, deﬁned by A → B = ¬A ∨ B; >– , deﬁned by A >– B = ∧| A → B; ◦– , deﬁned
by A ◦– B = ◦| A → B; etc.
The present paper introduces the following new group:
• Sequential operations: (conjunction), (disjunction), (universal quantiﬁer), (existential quantiﬁer),−∧| (recurrence),−∨| (corecurrence),
which also induces the reduction operation |>– deﬁned by A |>– B = −∧| A → B.
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Themain technical result of this paper is constructing a soundand complete axiomatization for thepropositional fragment
of CL whose logical vocabulary consists of , ⊥, ¬, ∧, ∨, , unionsq, , . An extension of this result to the ﬁrst-order level that
additionally includes the quantiﬁers,unionsq,∀,∃ is also outlined.
2. A tour of the zoo
In this section, we give a very brief and informal overview of the language of computability logic and the game-semantical
meanings of its main operators for those unfamiliar with the subject. In what follows,  and ⊥ are symbolic names for the
players to which we referred as the machine and the environment, respectively.
First of all, it should be noted that computability logic is a conservative extension of classical logic. Classical propositions—
as well as predicates as generalized propositions—are viewed as special, elementary sorts of games that have no moves and
are automatically won by the machine if true, and lost if false. The languages of various reasonably expressive fragments of
computability logic would typically include two sorts of atoms: elementary atoms p, q, r(x), s(x,y), …to represent elementary
games, and general atoms P, Q , R(x), S(x,y), …to represent any, not-necessarily elementary, games. The classically shaped
operators ¬, ∧ , ∨ ,∀,∃ are conservative generalizations of the corresponding classical operations from elementary games to
all games. That is in the sense that, when applied to elementary games, they again produce elementary games, and their
meanings happen to coincide with the classical meanings.
2.1. Constant elementary games
These are two 0-ary “operations”, for which we use the same symbols  and ⊥ as for the two players.  is an elementary
game automatically won by , and ⊥ is an elementary game won by ⊥. Just as classical logic, computability logic sees no
difference between two true or two false propositions, so that we have “Snow is white” = “0 = 0” =  and “Snow is black” =
“0 = 1” = ⊥.
2.2. Negation
Negation ¬ is a role-switch operation: ¬A is obtained from A by turning’s (legal) moves and wins into⊥’s (legal) moves
and wins, and vice versa. For example, if Chess means the game of chess from the point of view of the white player, then
¬Chess is the same game from the point of view of the black player. And where 0 = 0 is an elementary game automatically
won by , ¬0 = 0 is an elementary game automatically won by ⊥—there are no moves to interchange here, so only the
winners are interchanged. From this explanation it must be clear that ¬, when applied to elementary games (propositions
or predicates), indeed acts like classical negation, as promised.
2.3. Choice operations
The choice operations model decision steps in the course of interaction, with disjunction and existential quantiﬁer
meaning ’s choices, and conjunction and universal quantiﬁer meaning choices by ⊥. For instance, where f (x) is a function,xunionsqy(y = f (x)) is a game in which the ﬁrst move/choice is by the environment, consisting in specifying a particular value
m for x. Such a move, which intuitively can be seen as asking the machine the question “what is the value of f (m)?” brings
the game down to the positionunionsqy(y = f (m)). The next step is by the machine, which should specify a value n for y, further
bringing the game down to the elementary game n = f (m), won by the machine if true and lost if false. ’s move n can
thus be seen as answering/claiming that n is the value of f (m). From this explanation it must be clear thatxunionsqy(y = f (x))
represents the problem of computing f , with  having an algorithmic winning strategy for this game iff f is a computable
function. Similarly, where p(x) is a predicate,x(p(x) unionsq ¬p(x)) represents the problem of deciding p(x): here, again, the ﬁrst
move is by the environment, consisting in choosing a value m for x (asking whether p(m) is true); and the next step is by
the machine which, in order to win, should choose the true disjunct of p(m) unionsq ¬p(m), i.e., correctly answer the question.
Formally, A unionsq B can be deﬁned as¬(¬A  ¬B), or A  B can be deﬁned as¬(¬A unionsq ¬B); furthermore, assuming that the universe
of discourse is {1,2,3, . . .},xA(x) can be deﬁned as A(1)  A(2)  A(3)  . . . andunionsqxA(x) as A(1) unionsq A(2) unionsq A(3) unionsq . . . It should be
mentioned that making an initial choice of a component by the corresponding player in a choice combination of games is
not only that player’s privilege, but also an obligation: the player will be considered the loser if it fails to make a choice.
2.4. Parallel operations
The parallel operations combine games in a way that corresponds to the intuition of concurrent computations. Playing
A ∧ B or A ∨ Bmeans playing, in parallel, the two games A and B. In A ∧ B,  is considered the winner if it wins in both of the
components, while in A ∨ B it is sufﬁcient to win in one of the components. Then the parallel quantiﬁers and recurrences are
deﬁned by:
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∧xA(x) = A(1) ∧ A(2) ∧ A(3) ∧ . . .
∨xA(x) = A(1) ∨ A(2) ∨ A(3) ∨ . . .
∧| A = A ∧ A ∧ A ∧ . . .
∨| A = A ∨ A ∨ A ∨ . . .
To appreciate the difference between choice operations and their parallel counterparts, let us compare the games Chess ∨
¬Chess and Chess unionsq ¬Chess. The former is, in fact, a simultaneous play on two boards, where on the left board  plays white,
and on the right board plays black. There is a simple strategy for  that guarantees success against any adversary. All that
 needs to do is to mimic, in Chess, the moves made by ⊥ in ¬Chess, and vice versa. On the other hand, to win the game
Chess unionsq ¬Chess is not easy: here, at the very beginning,  has to choose between Chess and ¬Chess and then win the chosen
one-board game.
While all classical tautologies automatically holdwhen the classically shaped operators are applied to elementary games,
in the general (non-elementary) case the class of valid principles shrinks. For example, ¬P ∨ (P ∧ P) is no longer valid. The
above “mimicking strategy” would obviously fail in the three-board game
¬Chess ∨ (Chess ∧ Chess),
for here the best that can do is to pair ¬Chesswith one of the two conjuncts of Chess ∧ Chess. It is possible that then ¬Chess
and the unmatched Chess are both lost, in which case the whole game will be lost. As much as this example may remind us
of linear logic, it should be noted that the class of principles with parallel connectives validated by computability logic is not
the same as the class of multiplicative formulas provable in linear or afﬁne logic. An example separating CL from both linear
and afﬁne logics is Blass’s [3] principle(
(¬P ∨ ¬Q ) ∧ (¬R ∨ ¬S)
)
∨
(
(P ∨ R) ∧ (Q ∨ S)
)
,
not provable in afﬁne logic but valid in CL. The same applies to principles containing choice (“additive”) and recurrence
(“exponential”) operators.
2.5. Reduction
The operation →, deﬁned in the standard way by A → B = ¬A ∨ B, is perhaps most interesting from the computability-
theoretic point of view. Intuitively, A → B is the problem of reducing B to A. Putting it in other words, solving A → B means
solving B having A as an (external) computational resource. “Computational resource” is symmetric to “computational prob-
lem”: what is a problem (task) for the machine, is a resource for the environment, and vice versa. To get a feel of → as a
problem reduction operator, let us look at reducing the acceptance problem to the halting problem. The halting problem can
be expressed by
xy(Halts(x,y) unionsq ¬Halts(x,y)),
where Halts(x,y) is the predicate “Turing machine (encoded by) x halts on input y”. And the acceptance problem can be
expressed by
xy(Accepts(x,y) unionsq ¬Accepts(x,y)),
with Accepts(x,y)meaning “Turing machine x accepts input y”. While the acceptance problem is not decidable, it is algorith-
mically reducible to the halting problem. In particular, there is a machine that always wins the game
xy(Halts(x,y) unionsq ¬Halts(x,y)) → xy(Accepts(x,y) unionsq ¬Accepts(x,y)).
A strategy for solving this problem is to wait till the environment speciﬁes values m and n for x and y in the consequent,
thus asking  the question “does machine m accept input n?”. In response,  selects the same values m and n for x and
y in the antecedent (where the roles of  and ⊥ are switched), thus asking the counterquestion “does m halt on n?”. The
environment will have to correctly answer this counterquestion, or else it loses. If it answers “No”, then  also says “No”
in the consequent, i.e., selects the right disjunct there, as not halting implies not accepting. Otherwise, if the environment’s
response in the antecedent is “Yes”,  simulates machinem on input n until it halts and then selects, in the consequent, the
left or the right disjunct depending on whether the simulation accepted or rejected.
2.6. Blind operations
The blind group of operations comprises∀ and its dual∃ (∃x = ¬∀x¬). Themeaning of∀xA(x) is similar to that ofxA(x),
with the difference that the particular value of x that the environment “selects” is invisible to the machine, so that it has to
play blindly in a way that guarantees success no matter what that value is. This way, ∀ and ∃ produce games with imperfect
information.
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Compare the problems
x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x))
and
∀x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x)).
Both of them are about telling whether a given number is even or odd; the difference is only in whether that “given number”
is communicated to the machine or not. The ﬁrst problem is an easy-to-win, two-move-deep game of a structure that we
have already seen. The second game, on the other hand, is one-move deep with only by the machine to make a move—select
the “true” disjunct, which is hardly possible to do as the value of x remains unspeciﬁed.
As an example of a solvable non-elementary ∀-problem, let us look at
∀x
(
Even(x) unionsq Odd(x) → y(Even(x + y) unionsq Odd(x + y))),
solving which means solving what follows “∀x” without knowing the value of x. Unlike ∀x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x)), this game is
certainly winnable: The machine waits till the environment selects a value n for y in the consequent and also selects one of
the unionsq-disjuncts in the antecedent (if either selection is nevermade, themachine automaticallywins). Then: If n is even, in the
consequent the machine makes the same selection left or right as the environment made in the antecedent, and otherwise,
if n is odd, it reverses the environment’s selection.
2.7. Sequential operations
The new, sequential group of operations forms another natural phylum in this zoo of game operations. The sequential
conjunction AB is a game that starts and proceeds as a play of A; it will also end as an ordinary play of A unless, at some
point, ⊥ decides—by making a special switchmove—to abandon A and switch to B. In such a case the play restarts, continues
and ends as an ordinary play of B without the possibility to go back to A. AB is the same, only here it is  who decides
whether and when to switch from A to B. These generalize to the inﬁnite cases A0A1A2 . . . and A0A1A2 . . .: here the
corresponding player can make any ﬁnite number n of switches, in which case the winner in the play will be the player who
wins in An; and if an inﬁnite number of switches are made, then the player responsible for this is considered the loser. The
sequential quantiﬁers, as we may guess, are deﬁned by
xA(x) = A(1)A(2)A(3) . . .
and
xA(x) = A(1)A(2)A(3) . . . ,
and the sequential recurrence and corecurrence are deﬁned by
−∧| A = AAA . . .
and
−∨| A = AAA . . . .
Below are a few examples providing insights into the computational intuitions and motivations associated with the
sequential operations.
Let p(x) be any predicate. Remember that the gamex(¬p(x) unionsq p(x)) represents the problem of deciding p(x). Thenwhat
is represented byx(¬p(x)p(x))? If you guessed that this is the problem of semideciding p(x), you have guessed right. It
is not hard to see that this game has an effective winning strategy by  iff p(x) is semidecidable (recursively enumerable).
Indeed, if p(x) is semidecidable, a winning strategy is to wait until ⊥ selects a particular m for x, thus bringing the game
down to ¬p(m)p(m). After that, starts looking for a certiﬁcate of p(m)’s being true. If and when such a certiﬁcate is found
(meaning that p(m) is indeed true),  makes a switch move turning ¬p(m)p(m) into the true and hence -won p(m); and
if no certiﬁcate exists (meaning that p(m) is false), then keeps looking for a non-existent certiﬁcate forever and thus never
makes any moves, meaning that the game ends as ¬p(m), which, again, is a true and hence -won elementary game. And
vice versa: any effective winning strategy forx(¬p(x)p(x)) can obviously be seen as a semidecision procedure for p(x),
which accepts an input m iff the strategy ever makes a switch move in the scenario where ⊥’s initial choice of a value for x
ism.
Algorithmic solvability (computability) of games has been shown to be closed under modus ponens, as well as the rules
“from A and B conclude A ∧ B”, “from A concludexA”, “from A conclude ∧| A”. In view of these closures, the validity (= “always
computability”) of the principles discussed below implies certain known facts from the theory of computation. Needless to
say, those examples demonstrate howCL canbeused as a systematic tool for deﬁningnew interestingproperties and relations
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between computational problems, and not only reproducing already known theorems but also discovering an inﬁnite variety
of new facts.
The following formula, later proven—in a stronger form—to be a theorem of our presumably sound and complete (with
respect to validity) ﬁrst-order system CL11, implies—in a sense, “expresses”—the well-known fact that, if both a predicate
p(x) and its negation ¬p(x) are recursively enumerable, then p(x) is decidable:
x(¬p(x)p(x)) ∧x(p(x)¬p(x)) → x(p(x) unionsq ¬p(x)). (1)
Actually, the validity of the above formula means something more than just noted: it means that the problem of deciding
p(x) is reducible to the (∧-conjunction of) the problems of semideciding p(x) and ¬p(x). In fact, a reducibility in an even
stronger sense (in a sense that has no name) holds, expressed by the following valid formula:
x((¬p(x)p(x)) ∧ ((p(x)¬p(x)) → (p(x) unionsq ¬p(x))). (2)
Computability logic deﬁnes computability of a game A(x) as computability of its-closure, so the preﬁxx can be safely
removed in the above formula and, afterwriting simply “p” instead of “p(x)”, the validity of (2)means the same as the validity
of the following propositional-level formula, provable in our sound and complete propositional system CL9
(¬pp) ∧ (p¬p) → p unionsq ¬p. (3)
Furthermore, the above principle is valid not only for predicates (elementary games) but also for all games that we
consider, as evidenced by the provability of the following formula in (the sound) CL9
(¬PP) ∧ (P¬P) → P unionsq ¬P. (4)
Similarly, formula (1) remains provable in CL11 and hence valid with P(x) instead of p(x)
x(¬P(x)P(x)) ∧x(P(x)¬P(x)) → x(P(x) unionsq ¬P(x)). (5)
For our next example, remember the relation of mapping reducibility (more often called many-one reducibility) of a
predicate q(x) to a predicate p(x), deﬁned as existence of an effective function f such that, for any n, q
(
n
)
is equivalent
to p
(
f (n)
)
. It is not hard to see that this relation holds if and only if the game
xunionsqy((q(x) → p(y)) ∧ (p(y) → q(x))),
which we abbreviate asxunionsqy(q(x) ↔ p(y)), has an algorithmic winning strategy by . In this sense,xunionsqy(q(x) ↔ p(y))
expresses the problem ofmapping reducing q(x) to p(x). Then the validity (that can be established through CL11-provability)
of the following formula implies the known fact that, if q(x) is mapping reducible to p(x) and p(x) is recursively enumerable,
then so is q(x):2
xunionsqy(q(x) ↔ p(y)) ∧x(¬p(x)p(x)) → x(¬q(x)q(x)). (6)
As in the earlier examples, the validity of (6), in fact, means something evenmore: itmeans that the problem of semideciding
q(x) is reducible to the (∧-conjunction of the) problems of mapping reducing q(x) to p(x) and semideciding p(x).
Certain other reducibilities hold only in a sense weaker than the sense captured by→. We characterized A → B as a game
where can use A as a computational resource: playing in the role of⊥ in A, can observe how the adversary is solving A and
employ that information in its solvingB. It is however important to note that only one “copy” ofA is available to as a resource
in A → B. In many cases, however, more than one runs of Amay be necessary. An example of a reduction of this sort is Turing
reduction, where the oracle (resource A) can be queried an unlimited number of times. A way to account for the possibility
of repeated usage of A is preﬁxing it with a recurrence operation. In the following two examples a recurrence that sufﬁces is
∧| , which (just as the other types of recurrences) induces the weak reduction operation >– deﬁned by A >– B = ∧| A → B.
The following formula is valid (and remains so with P(x,y) instead of p(x,y))
xy(¬p(x,y) unionsq p(x,y)) >–x(¬∃yp(x,y)∃yp(x,y)), (7)
meaning that the problem of semideciding a predicate ∃yp(x,y) is >– -reducible to the problem of deciding p(x,y). This, in
turn, implies the known fact that if p(x,y) is decidable, then∃yp(x,y) is recursively enumerable. Unlike the earlier caseswhere
we appealed to provability in (the sound) CL9 or CL11 in claiming validity, (7) is not a formula of the languages of those
systems because it contains >– . So, let us verify its validity directly.
Here is ’s strategy for (7), equally good for (and not depending on) any predicate p(x,y). Wait till ⊥ speciﬁes a value m
for x in the consequent, thus bringing the game down to
2 By the way, the same principle does not hold with “Turing reducible” instead of “mapping reducible”.
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xy(¬p(x,y) unionsq p(x,y)) >– (¬∃yp(m,y)∃yp(m,y)).
Then, initialize i to 1 and do the following. Specify x and y in the ith copy of the antecedent asm and i, respectively.⊥will have
to respond by choosing one of the unionsq-disjuncts in that copy, which now looks like¬p(m,i) unionsq p(m,i), or else it loses. If⊥ chooses
¬p(m,i), increment i to i + 1 and repeat the step. Otherwise, if ⊥ chooses p(m,i), make a switch move in the consequent and
rest your case.
Let us see one more example with >– -reducibility. Let NEQ(x,y) be the predicate “Turing machines (encoded by) x and
y are not equivalent”, with equivalence meaning that the two machines accept exactly the same inputs. This predicate is
neither semidecidable nor co-semidecidable. However, the problem of its semideciding >– -reduces to the halting problem.
Speciﬁcally,  has an algorithmic winning strategy for the following game:
zt(¬Halts(z,t) unionsq Halts(z,t)) >–xy(¬NEQ(x,y)NEQ(x,y)). (8)
A strategy here is to wait till ⊥ speciﬁes some values m and n for x and y in the consequent, respectively. Then, initialize i
to 1 and do the following. Specify z and t as m and i in one yet-unused copy of the antecedent, and as n and i in another
yet-unused copy. That is, ask⊥whetherm halts on input i and whether n halts on the same input.⊥will have to provide the
correct pair of answers, or else it loses.
(1) If the answers are “No,No”, increment i to i + 1 and repeat the step.
(2) If the answers are “Yes,Yes”, then simulate bothm and n on input i until they halt. If both machines accept or both reject,
increment i to i + 1 and repeat the step. Otherwise, if one accepts and one rejects, make a switchmove in the consequent
and celebrate victory.
(3) If the answers are “Yes,No”, then simulate m on i until it halts. If m rejects i, increment i to i + 1 and repeat the step.
Otherwise, ifm accepts i, make a switch move in the consequent and you win.
(4) If the answers are “No,Yes”, then simulate n on i until it halts. If n rejects i, increment i to i + 1 and repeat the step.
Otherwise, if n accepts i, make a switch move in the consequent and you win.
For our last example, remember the concept of the Kolmogorov complexity of a given number m, which can be deﬁned
as the size of the smallest Turing machine that returnsm on input 1. We denote the Kolmogorov complexity of x by k(x). The
latter is known to be bounded, not exceeding x itself.3 Function k(x) is not computable, meaning that  has no algorithmic
winning strategy in
xunionsqy(y = k(x)).
In contrast, the problem
x−∨| unionsqy(y = k(x))
does have an algorithmic solution. Here is one: wait till ⊥ speciﬁes a value m for x, thus asking “what is the Kolmogorov
complexity of m?” and bringing the game down to
−∨| unionsqy(y = k(m)). Answer that it is m, i.e., specify y as m, and after that
start simulating, in parallel, all machines nwith n < m on input 1. Whenever you ﬁnd a machine n that returnsm on input 1
and is smaller than any of the previously found such machines, make a switch move and, in the new copy ofunionsqy(y = k(m)),
specify y as the size (=logarithm) |n| of n. This obviously guarantees success: sooner or later the real Kolmogorov complexity
c of m will be reached and named; and, even though the strategy will never be sure that k(m) is not something yet smaller
than c, it will never really ﬁnd a reason to further reconsider its latest claim that c = k(m).
The following game also has an algorithmic winning strategy, describing which is left as an exercise for the reader:
xy(k(x) = (x − y)).
2.8. Branching operations
The branching operations come in the form of branching recurrence ◦| and its dual branching corecurrence ◦| , which can
be deﬁned by
◦| A = ¬◦| ¬A. The two other—parallel and sequential—sorts of recurrences we have already seen, and it might
be a good idea to explain ◦| by comparing it with them.
What is common to all members of the family of (co)recurrence operations is that, when applied to A, they turn it into a
game playing which means repeatedly playing A. In terms of resources, recurrence operations generate multiple “copies” of
A, thus making A a reusable/recyclable resource. The difference between the various sorts of recurrences is how “reusage” is
exactly understood.
Imagine a computer that has aprogramsuccessfully playingChess. The resource that such a computer provides is obviously
something stronger than just Chess, for it permits to play Chess as many times as the user wishes, while Chess, as such,
3 Well, strictly speaking, this is so only for sufﬁciently large numbers x. But since only for ﬁnitely many (very small) numbers x do we have k(x) > x, we
may ignore this minor technicality and assume in our treatment that k(x) never exceeds x.
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only assumes one play. The simplest operating system would allow to start a session of Chess, then—after ﬁnishing or
abandoning and destroying it—start a new play again, and so on. The game that such a system plays—i.e., the resource that it
supports/provides—is the already known to us sequential recurrence −∧| Chess, which assumes an unbounded number of plays
of Chess in a sequential fashion. A more advanced operating system, however, would not require to destroy the old sessions
before starting new ones; rather, it would allow to run as many parallel sessions as the user needs. This is what is captured
by the parallel recurrence ∧| Chess. As a resource, ∧| Chess is obviously stronger than −∧| Chess as it gives the user more ﬂexibility.
But ∧| is still not the strongest form of reusage. A really good operating system would not only allow the user to start new
sessions of Chesswithout destroying old ones; it would alsomake it possible to branch/replicate each particular stage of each
particular session, i.e., create any number of “copies” of any already reached position of the multiple parallel plays of Chess,
thus giving the user the possibility to try different continuations from the same position. What corresponds to this intuition
is the branching recurrence ◦| Chess.
Thus, the user of the resource ◦| A does not have to restart A from the very beginning every time it wants to reuse it; rather,
it is (essentially) allowed to backtrack to any of the previous—not necessarily starting—positions and try a new continuation
from there, thus depriving the adversary of the possibility to reconsider the moves it has already made in that position. This
is in fact the type of reusage every purely software resource allows or would allow in the presence of an advanced operating
system and unlimitedmemory: one can start running process A; then fork it at any stage thus creating two threads that have
a commonpast but possibly diverging futures (with the possibility to treat one of the threads as a “backup copy” and preserve
it for backtracking purposes); then further fork any of the branches at any time; and so on. The less ﬂexible type of reusage of
A assumed by ∧| A, on the other hand, is closer to what inﬁnitely many autonomous physical resources would naturally offer,
such as an unlimited number of independently acting robots each performing task A, or an unlimited number of computers
with limited memories, each one only capable of and responsible for running a single thread of process A. Here the effect
of replicating/forking an advanced stage of A cannot be achieved unless, by good luck, there are two identical copies of the
stage, meaning that the corresponding two robots or computers have so far acted in precisely the same ways. As for −∧| A, it
models the task performed by a single reusable physical resource—the resource that can perform task A over and over again
any number of times.
A formal deﬁnition of branching recurrence is more complicated than the deﬁnitions of its parallel and sequential
counterparts. For this reason, in our present relaxed tour we refrain from going into more technical details of how, exactly,
games of the form ◦| A are played. Such details, together with formal deﬁnitions and additional explanations, can be found,
for example, in [16]. ◦| also has a series of weaker versions obtained by imposing various restrictions on the quantity and
form of reusages. Among the interesting and natural weakenings of ◦| is the countable branching recurrence ◦| ℵ0 in the style of
Blass’s [2,3] repetition operation R. See [17] for a discussion of such operations.
Branching recurrence ◦| stands out as the strongest of all recurrence operations, allowing to reuse A (in ◦| A) in the strongest
algorithmic sense possible. This makes the associated reduction operation ◦– , deﬁned by A ◦– B = ◦| A → B, the weakest
and hencemost general form of algorithmic reduction. The well-known concept of Turing reduction has the same claims. The
latter, however, is only deﬁned for the traditional, non-interactive sorts of computational problems—two-step, input-output,
question-answer sorts of problems that in our terms are written as x(p(x) unionsq ¬p(x)) (the problem of deciding predicate
p) or xunionsqy(y = f (x)) (the problem of computing function f ). And it is no surprise that our ◦– , when restricted to such
problems, turns out to be equivalent to Turing reduction. Furthermore, when A and B are traditional sorts of problems, A ◦– B
further turns out to be equivalent to A >– B (but not A |>– B), as the differences between A >– B and A ◦– B, while substantial
in the general (truly interactive) case, turn out to be too subtle to be relevant when A is a game that models only a very short
and simple potential dialogue between the interacting parties, consisting in just asking a question and giving an answer.
The beneﬁts from the greater degree of resource-reusage ﬂexibility offered by A ◦– B (as opposed to A >– B) are related to
the possibility for the machine to try different reactions to the same action(s) by the environment in A. But such potential
beneﬁts cannot be realized when A is, say,x(p(x) unionsq ¬p(x)). Because here a given individual session of A immediately ends
with an environment’s move, to which the machine simply has no legal or meaningful responses at all, let alone having
multiple possible responses to experiment with.
Thus, both ◦– and >– are conservative extensions of Turing reduction from traditional sorts of problems to problems
of arbitrary degrees and forms of interactivity. Of these two operations, however, only ◦– has the moral right to be called a
legitimate successor of Turing reducibility, in the sense that, just like Turing reducibility (in its limited context), ◦– rather
than >– is an ultimate formal counterpart of our most general intuition of algorithmic reduction. And perhaps it is no
accident that, as shown in [11,14], its logical behavior—along with the choice operations—is precisely captured by Heyting’s
intuitionistic calculus. As an aside, this means that CL offers a good justiﬁcation—in the form of a mathematically strict and
intuitively convincing semantics—of the constructivistic claims of intuitionistic logic, and a materialization of Kolmogorov’s
[18] well known yet so far rather abstract thesis, according to which intuitionistic logic is a logic of problems.
Our recurrence operations, in their logical spirit, are reminiscent of the exponential operators of linear logic. It should be
noted that, as shown in [16], linear—in fact, afﬁne—logic turns out to be sound but incomplete when its additives are read
as our choice operators, multiplicatives as parallel operators, and exponentials as either parallel or branching recurrences.
Here the sequential sort of recurrences stands out in that linear logic becomes simply unsound if its exponentials !,? are
interpreted as our −∧| ,
−∨| .
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Just like the acceptance problemxy(Accepts(x,y) unionsq ¬Accepts(x,y)), the Kolmogorov complexity problemxunionsqy(y =
k(x)
)
is known to be algorithmically reducible—speciﬁcally, Turing reducible—to the halting problem. Unlike the former case,
however, the reduction in the latter case essentially requires repeated usage of the halting problem as a resource. That is,
the reducibility holds only in the sense of ◦– or >– but not in the sense of →. As an exercise, the reader may try to come
up with an informal description of an algorithmic winning strategy for either one of the following games:
xy(Halts(x,y) unionsq ¬Halts(x,y)) >–xunionsqy(y = k(x));
xy(Halts(x,y) unionsq ¬Halts(x,y)) ◦–xunionsqy(y = k(x)).
3. Sequential operators in CL-based applied systems
As we had a chance to see, CL offers a ﬂexible and convenient formalism for specifying and studying computational
problems and relations between them. It is a formal theory of computability in the same sense as classical logic is a formal
theory of truth, and axiomatizations of various fragments of it provide a systematic way to answer the fundamental question
‘what canbe computed’. CL also takesus one step closer todeveloping the long-overdue comprehensive theories of interactive
computation and interactive complexity. In fact, if and when further advanced and sufﬁciently developed (but certainly not
in its present, embryonic form), computability logic itself can be considered such a theory or, at least, an integral part of it.
The signiﬁcance of CL, however, is not limited to theory of computing or pure logic. All of the soundness results for the
known axiomatizations of CL come in the strong form that we call uniform-constructive soundness. The uniform-constructive
soundness of a deductive systemmeans that: (uniform soundness:) for every provable formula F , there is a uniform, meaning-
independent strategy in the sense that it wins the game represented by F no matter how its atoms are interpreted,4 and
(constructive soundness:) such a strategy can be effectively extracted from a proof of F . This is good news, signifying that
CL is not only about “what can be computed”, but also equally about “how can be computed”, opening various application
areas, such as (constructive) applied theories, (interactive) knowledgebase systems, or (resource-oriented) AI systems for
planning. All such systems would follow the same general scheme. One takes a basic set of formulas expressing problems
(computational, informational or physical resources) whose solutions are available (known, maintainable, providable). To
such a set S, depending on the context,wemay refer as the set of axioms, or the knowledgebase, or the resourcebase. Provability
of a formula F in the system can be deﬁned as provability—in pure CL—of the formula S → F , with S here identiﬁedwith the∧-
conjunction of its elements.5 Such a system becomes a problem-solving tool: all one needs for solving a problem is to express
it in the language of the system and then ﬁnd a proof of it. In view of the uniform-constructive soundness of the underlying
axiomatization of CL and the closure of computability under modus ponens, a solution for the problem can be automatically
obtained from its proof. This is a very brief summary. See, for example, Section 10 of [16] for an extended discussion of
CL-based applied systems. In this section, we only outline—very brieﬂy and informally—some intuitions associated with
sequential operators that are relevant to potential applications in knowledgebase and planning systems.
In knowledgebase systems, sequential operators can be used to express dynamic or unstable knowledge. Imagine a
knowledgebase system that maintains information on all people. Part of the information provided by such a system is
knowledge of whether any given person is dead or alive. What the old (sequential-operator-free) language of CL could offer
to express such knowledge, with x ranging over people, is
∧| x(Alive(x) unionsq Dead(x)) : (9)
a system containing such a formula/resource in its knowledgebase is able to repeatedly tell us, for any person, whether he
or she is alive or dead. This is sufﬁcient to represent a snapshot of some stage of the knowledge(base). Facts change over
time though and, in particular, so does the alive/dead status of a person. Yet, once a system asserts Alive(Tom) in the process
of playing (9), it cannot take it back later, speciﬁcally, when Tom dies. So, (9) is not an adequate way to express a dynamic
informational resource of people’s alive/dead status. What does ﬁt the bill is
∧| x(Alive(x)Dead(x))
instead (but, note, by no means ∧| x(Dead(x)Alive(x))).
Imagine further that the system maintains dynamic information on everybody’s marital status. Unlike the alive/dead
status, the marital status may change many times through a person’s lifetime. To account for having this informational
resource, we would include the following formula in the system’s knowledgebase
∧| x−∨| (Single(x)Married(x)).
4 As opposed simple soundness which means existence of a winning strategy for each particular interpretation, so that different interpretations may
require different strategies.
5 Of course, this is not the only way to construct CL-based systems. But we are trying to keep things as simple as possible in this brief discussion.
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Of course, in both of the above examples, the preﬁx ∧| x can be replaced by ◦| x or just∧x. This would not change the
strength of the knowledgebase, but taking ∧x instead of ∧| x or ◦| x could negatively affect its efﬁciency, obligating the
system to resolve each and every person’s status no matter whether so requested or not.
Having sequential operators in CL-based planning systems could be evenmore imperative, as such systems are inherently
dynamic, where the truth status of various facts keeps changing from situation to situation, and is affected not only by the
environment (as in dynamic knowledgebase systems) but also by actions of the agent. Here we restrict ourselves to just one
simple and naive example to provide some insights.
Imagine a controller for the outside front entrance light,whose job is to turn the light on at night and—to save energy—turn
it off during thedaytime. The controller has the capability to repeatedly turn the light on andoff. This capability, as a (physical)
resource, can be expressed by the formula −∧| (OffOn), with Off expressing the fact “the light is off”, and On expressing “the
light is on”. It further has a bright-light sensor, reporting whether it is day or night (or rather whether it is bright enough or
not quite so). Let Day mean “it is bright enough” and Night mean the opposite. The resource provided by such a sensor can
then be expressed by
−∨| (DayNight). And the goal of the controller is to maintain the truth of (Day ∧ Off) ∨ (Night ∧ On). The
overall planning/maintainance problem can then be expressed by
−∨| (DayNight) ∧ −∧| (OffOn) → (Day ∧ Off) ∨ (Night ∧ On). (10)
Can the controller, with perfect knowledge of CL and without any other speciﬁc knowledge of the world (namely, without
knowledge of themeanings of the atoms of (10)), successfully perform its job?With a little thought, this question can be seen
to be equivalent to whether there is an effective winning strategy for (10). Sure there is one: every time the environment
switches from Day to Night, switch from Off to On; and every time the environment switches to the next
−∨| -component in
the left conjunct of the antecedent, switch to the next −∧| -component in the right conjunct. In this example, the resourcebase
of the planning agent is {−∨| (DayNight),−∧| (OffOn)}, and the goal task is (Day ∧ Off) ∨ (Night ∧ On).
Abstract resource semantics, brieﬂy discussed in Appendix A, potentially offers an alternative (similar but not the same)
way of using the formalism of computability logic in planning systems.
4. Formal deﬁnitions
Here we only provide formal deﬁnitions for sequential operations, because they have never been deﬁned before. Strict
deﬁnitions of the other game operations, as well as deﬁnitions of games and all related basic concepts can be found, for
example, in [16]. In fact, in what follows we rely on [16] as an external source. Although long, the latter is very easy to read
and has a convenient glossary to look up any unfamiliar terms and symbols. A reader not familiar with [16] or unwilling to
do some parallel reading, may want to either stop here or just browse the rest of the paper without attempting to go into
the technical details of formal deﬁnitions and proofs. Due to the very dynamic recent development, computability logic has
already reached a point where it is no longer feasible to reintroduce all relevant concepts all over again in each new paper
on the subject.
We ﬁx § as a special-meaning symbol, and say that a run  is presequential iff every move of  is either § (we call such
moves switchmoves, or simply switches) or .α (we call suchmoves non-switchmoves) for some string α. Where℘ ∈ {,⊥},
by the ℘-degree of such a run we mean the number of switch moves made by player ℘ in it, if this number is ﬁnite; if  has
inﬁnitely many switches by ℘, then we say that its ℘-degree is inﬁnite. When  = 〈,℘.α,〉, by the degree of the (indicated
occurrence of the) non-switch labmove6 ℘.α wemean the ℘-degree of. Where i ≥ 0, by #i wemean the result of deleting
from all labmoves except the non-switch labmoves of degree i, and then further deleting the preﬁx “.” in each such labmove.
For example, we have:
〈.α, ⊥.β, §, .γ , ⊥.δ, ⊥§, .σ , ⊥.ω, §, .ψ〉#0 = 〈α,⊥β,⊥δ〉;
〈.α, ⊥.β, §, .γ , ⊥.δ, ⊥§, .σ , ⊥.ω, §, .ψ〉#1 = 〈γ ,σ ,⊥ω〉;
〈.α, ⊥.β, §, .γ , ⊥.δ, ⊥§, .σ , ⊥.ω, §, .ψ〉#2 = 〈ψ〉;
〈.α, ⊥.β, §, .γ , ⊥.δ, ⊥§, .σ , ⊥.ω, §, .ψ〉#3 = 〈〉.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let A0, . . . , An (n ≥ 1) be any constant games. We deﬁne the games A0 . . .An and A0 . . .An as follows:
(1) • A position is a legal position of A0 . . .An iff is presequential, the⊥-degree of does not exceed n, the-degree
of or any of its initial segments does not exceed the ⊥-degree of the same position and, for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n},#i is
a legal position of Ai.
• Let  be a legal run of A0 . . .An, and k be the⊥-degree of . Then  is a⊥-won run of A0 . . .An iff #k is a⊥-won
run of Ak .
6 Remember from [16] that labmove means “labeled move”, i.e., a move preﬁxed with  or ⊥, with such a preﬁx indicating who has made the move.
Terminologically we are not always strict about differentiating between moves and labmoves, and often say “move” where, strictly speaking, we should
have said “labmove”.
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(2) • A position is a legal position of A0 . . .An iff is presequential, the-degree of does not exceed n, the⊥-degree
of or any of its initial segments does not exceed the -degree of the same position and, for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n},#i is
a legal position of Ai.
• Let  be a legal run of A0 . . .An, and k be the-degree of . Then  is a-won run of A0 . . .An iff #k is a-won
run of Ak .
Thus, whenever ⊥ wants to switch from a given component Ai to Ai+1 in A0 . . .An, it makes the move §. But, as we see,
, too, is expected to make switch moves in a -game to “catch up” with ⊥.7 The switches made by ⊥ in a -game we call
leading switches, and the switchesmade by in a-gamewe call catch-up switches. As for a non-switchmove .α by either
player ℘, its effect is making move α in Ak , where k is the number of switch moves made by ℘ so far. A0 . . .An, of course,
is symmetric. Speciﬁcally, here it is  whomakes leading switches, while the switches by ⊥ are catch-up switches. In either
case, the number of leading switches cannot exceed n, and the number of catch-up switches cannot exceed the number of
leading switches.
Intuitively, in a play (run)  over a sequential combination of games, #i is the sequence of moves made within the ith
component (starting the count from 0 rather than 1) of the combination. Each switchmove by a player ℘ “activates” the next
component for that player, in the sense that every subsequent non-switch move .α (until the next switch) by ℘ will signify
making move α in that component; we also say that the effect of .α is making move α in the corresponding component. This
intuitive and semiformal terminology, on which we will heavily rely in our further treatments, extends to more complex
situations and other types of moves as well. Consider, for example, the game (A unionsq B) ∧
(
(C  D)(E  F)
)
and the legal run
〈1.1,⊥2.§,⊥2..2〉 of it. We say that:
• The effect of the move 1.1 by  is (or such a move signiﬁes) choosing A within the A unionsq B component. Indeed, notice
that after this move is made in (A unionsq B) ∧ ((C  D)(E  F)), the game is brought down to—in the sense that it continues
as—A ∧ ((C  D)(E  F)).
• The effect of the next move 2.§ by ⊥ is switching from C  D to E  F in the (C  D)(E  F) component.
• The effect of the last move 2..2 by ⊥ is choosing F in the (E  F) component. If this move was made before the switch,
then its effect would be choosing D in the (C  D) component.
Deﬁnition 4.1 extends from ﬁnite cases to the inﬁnite case as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let A0,A1,A2, . . . be any constant games. We deﬁne the games A0A1A2 . . . and A0A1A2 . . . as follows:
(1) • A position is a legal position of A0A1A2 . . . iff is presequential, the-degree of or any of its initial segments
does not exceed the ⊥-degree of the same position and, for each i ≥ 0, #i is a legal position of Ai.
• Let  be a legal run of A0A1A2 . . .. Then  is a ⊥-won run of A0A1A2 . . . iff the ⊥-degree of  is ﬁnite and,
where k is that ⊥-degree, #k is a ⊥-won run of Ak .
(2) • A position is a legal position of A0A1A2 . . . iff is presequential, the⊥-degree of or any of its initial segments
does not exceed the -degree of the same position and, for each i ≥ 0, #i is a legal position of Ai.
• Let  be a legal run of A0A1A2 . . .. Then  is a -won run of A0A1A2 . . . iff the -degree of  is ﬁnite and,
where k is that -degree, #k is a -won run of Ak .
Even though the above deﬁnitions ofﬁcially deﬁne  and  only for constant games, they extend to all games in the
standard way, as explained in the second paragraph of Section 4 of [16]. Speciﬁcally, for any not-necessarily constant games
A0, . . . ,An, A0 . . .An is the unique game such that, for any valuation (assignment of constants to variables) e, we have
e[A0 . . .An] = e[A0] . . .e[An]. Similarly for  and the inﬁnite cases of ,. (The meaning of the notation e[. . .], just as the
meanings of any other unfamiliar terms or notations, as already noted, can and should be looked up in [16].)
The remaining sequential operations, as we already know from Section 2.7, are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.3. For any games A or A(x):
(1) −∧| A = AAA . . .
(2)
−∨| A = AAA . . .
(3) xA(x) = A(1)A(2)A(3) . . .
(4) xA(x) = A(1)A(2)A(3) . . .
It is not hard to see that the DeMorgan dualities hold for the sequential operations, just as they do for all other groups of
operations (parallel, choice, branching, blind). Namely, we have:
¬(A0 . . .An) = ¬A0 . . .¬An,
¬(A0 . . .An) = ¬A0 . . .¬An,
7 This arrangement is necessary to ensure that the sequential operators do not violate the static property of games.
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and similarly for inﬁnite sequential conjunctions and disjunctions, including −∧| A,
−∨| A,xA(x),xA(x).
Whenever new game operations are introduced, one needs to make sure that they preserve the static property of games,
for otherwise many things can go wrong:
Theorem 4.4. The class of static games is closed under our sequential operations.
Proof. Given in Appendix B. 
5. Logic CL9
In this section, we introduce the propositional system CL9. The building blocks of its language are:
• Inﬁnitely many non-logical elementary atoms, for which we use the metavariables p,q,r,s.
• Inﬁnitely many non-logical general atoms, for which we use the metavariables P,Q ,R,S.
• The 0-ary operators  and ⊥. They can as well be called logical atoms.
• The unary operator ¬.
• The operators ∧, ∨ ,  , unionsq ,,. Their arities are not ﬁxed and can be any n ≥ 2.
Formulas, to which we refer as CL9-formulas, are built from atoms and operators in the standard way, with the require-
ment (yielding no loss of expressiveness) that ¬ can only be applied to non-logical atoms. A literal means L or ¬L, where L
is an atom. Such a literal is said to be elementary, general, non-logical or logical if L is so. When F is not a non-logical atom,
¬F is understood as an abbreviation deﬁned by
¬ = ⊥
¬⊥ = 
¬¬E = E
¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬En
¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬En
¬(E1  . . .  En) = ¬E1 unionsq . . . unionsq ¬En
¬(E1 unionsq . . . unionsq En) = ¬E1  . . .  ¬En
¬(E1 . . .En) = ¬E1 . . .¬En
¬(E1 . . .En) = ¬E1 . . .¬En
Also, if we write E → F , it is to be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F .
The formulas that do not contain elementary non-logical atoms we call general-base, and the formulas that do not
contain general atoms we call elementary-base. This terminology also extends to the corresponding two fragments of CL9;
in particular, the general-base fragment of CL9 is the set of all general-base theorems of CL9, and the elementary-base fragment
of CL9 is the set of all elementary-base theorems of CL9.
An interpretation for the language of CL9 a function that sends each non-logical elementary atom to an elementary
game, and sends each general atom to any, not-necessarily elementary, static game. This mapping extends to all formulas
by letting it respect all logical operators as the corresponding game operations. That is, * = , (EF)* = E*F*, etc. When
F* = A, we say that * interprets F as A.
A formula F is said to be valid iff, for every interpretation *, the game F* is computable. And F is uniformly valid iff there
is an HPMH, called a uniform solution for F , such thatHwins (computes) F* for every interpretation *.
A sequential (sub)formula is one of the form F0 . . .Fn or F0 . . .Fn. We say that F0 is the head of such a (sub)formula,
and F1, . . . ,Fn form its tail.
The capitalization of a formula is the result of replacing in it every sequential subformula by its head.
A formula is said to be elementary iff it is a formula of classical propositional logic, i.e., contains no general atoms and
no operators other than ,⊥,¬, ∧ ,∨.
An occurrence of a subformula in a formula is positive iff it is not in the scope of ¬. Otherwise it is negative. According
to our conventions regarding the usage of ¬, only atoms may have negative occurrences.
A surface occurrence is an occurrence that is not in the scope of a choice connective and not in the tail of any sequential
subformula.
The elementarization of a CL9-formula F means the result of replacing in the capitalization of F every surface occurrence
of the form G1  . . .  Gn by , every surface occurrence of the form G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by ⊥, and every positive surface occurrence
of each general literal by ⊥.
Finally, a formula is said to be stable iff its elementarization is a classical tautology; otherwise it is instable.
Deﬁnition 5.1. With P → F meaning “from premise(s) P conclude F”, CL9 is the system given by the following four rules of
inference:8
8 There are no axioms, but the rule of Wait can act as such when the set of its premises is empty.
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Wait: H → F , where F is stable and H is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) whenever F has a surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result of
replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
(2) whenever F has a surface occurrence of a subformula G0G1 . . .Gn, H contains the result of replacing that
occurrence in F by G1 . . .Gn.9
Choose: H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F a surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by Gi for some
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Switch: H → F , whereH is the result of replacing in F a surface occurrence of a subformula G0G1 . . .Gn by G1 . . .Gn.9
Match: H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F two—one positive and one negative—surface occurrences of some
general atom by a non-logical elementary atom that does not occur in F .
Example 5.2. The following is a CL9-proof of P unionsq Q → PQ :
1. ¬q ∨ q (from {} by Wait);
2. ¬Q ∨ Q (from 1 by Match);
3. ¬Q ∨ (PQ ) (from 2 by Switch);
4. ¬p ∨ (pQ ) (from {} by Wait);
5. ¬P ∨ (PQ ) (from 4 by Match);
6. (¬P  ¬Q ) ∨ (PQ ) (from {3,5} by Wait).
On the other hand, PQ → P unionsq Q is not provable. Indeed, (¬P¬Q ) ∨ (P unionsq Q ) is instable, so Wait cannot be used at the
last step of its derivation. It contains no , so Switch cannot be used, either. And it has only one surface occurrence of an
atom, soMatch does not apply. This leaves us with Choose. Then the premise is (¬P¬Q ) ∨ P or (¬P¬Q ) ∨ Q . In either case,
Choose no longer applies. If we are dealing with (¬P¬Q ) ∨ Q , evidently the other three rules do not apply either. And if we
are dealing with (¬P¬Q ) ∨ P, then onlyMatch applies, which takes us to the premise (¬p¬Q ) ∨ p. This formula could only
be the conclusion of Wait, where the set of premises consists of ¬Q ∨ p. Now we are stuck with this premise, as it cannot be
derived by any of the four rules of CL9.
With about an equal amount of effort, where CL9  F means “F is provable in CL9” and CL9  F means “F is not provable
in CL9”, one can further verify that:
• CL9  PQ → P ∨ Q ;
• CL9  P ∨ Q → PQ .
Example 5.3. The following is a CL9-proof of (P ∧ Q ) ∨ (¬P¬R) ∨ (¬Q¬S) ∨ (R unionsq S):
1. (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p¬R) ∨ ¬s ∨ s (from {} by Wait);
2. (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p¬R) ∨ ¬S ∨ S (from 1 by Match);
3. (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p¬R) ∨ ¬S ∨ (R unionsq S) (from 2 by Choose);
4. (p ∧ q) ∨ ¬r ∨ (¬q¬S) ∨ r (from {} by Wait);
5. (p ∧ q) ∨ ¬R ∨ (¬q¬S) ∨ R (from 4 by Match);
6. (p ∧ q) ∨ ¬R ∨ (¬q¬S) ∨ (R unionsq S) (from 5 by Choose);
7. (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p¬R) ∨ (¬q¬S) ∨ (R unionsq S) (from {3,6} by Wait);
8. (p ∧ Q ) ∨ (¬p¬R) ∨ (¬Q¬S) ∨ (R unionsq S) (from 7 by Match);
9. (P ∧ Q ) ∨ (¬P¬R) ∨ (¬Q¬S) ∨ (R unionsq S) (from 8 by Match).
Exercise 5.4. Verify that:
1. CL9  P ∨ ¬P
2. CL9  P unionsq ¬P
3. CL9  P¬P
4. CL9  P → P ∧ P
5. CL9  P → P  P
6. CL9  P → PP
7. CL9  P ∧ Q → Q ∧ P
8. CL9  P  Q → Q  P
9. CL9  PQ → QP
Exercise 5.5. Check the CL9-provability status of the formulas of Exercise 5.4 with p,q instead of P,Q . Where are you getting
differences?
9 In this deﬁnition, if n = 1, G1 . . .Gn or G1 . . .Gn is simply understood as G1.
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Exercise 5.6. Construct CL9-proofs of formulas (3) and (4) of Section 2.7. Try to extract winning strategies from your proofs.
Below comes our main theorem. It is simply the later-proven Lemmas 7.1 and 9.1 put together:
Theorem 5.7. CL9  F iff F is valid (any CL9-formula F). Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes a CL9-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an HPM H such that, for
every interpretation *, H computes F*.
(b) If CL9  F , then F* is not computable for some interpretation * that interprets all elementary atoms of F as ﬁnitary predicates
of arithmetical complexity2, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems of the form (A
1
1
unionsq . . . unionsq A1m)  . . .  (Am1 unionsq . . . unionsq Amm),
where each A
j
i
is a ﬁnitary predicate of arithmetical complexity 2.
The following facts are immediate corollaries of Theorem 5.7, so we state them without proofs:
Fact 5.8. A CL9-formula is valid iff it is uniformly valid.
Fact 5.9. CL9 is a conservative extension of classical logic. That is, an elementary formula is provable in CL9 iff it is a classical
tautology.
It is also worth noting that CL9 is decidable, with a brute force decision algorithm obviously running in polynomial space.
Whether there are more efﬁcient algorithms is unknown.
6. Preliminaries for the soundness proof
Our proof of Theorem 5.7 starts here and ends in Section 9. It closely follows the soundness and completeness proof given
in [6,7] for the less expressive, ,-free logic CL2, but the style here is much more relaxed and schematic, often relying on
arguments such as “with some thought, we can see that...” in places where [6,7] would provide a full technical elaboration
of such “some thought”. The present section contains certain necessary preliminaries for the soundness part of the proof.
6.1. Hyperformulas
In the bottom-up (from conclusion to premises) view, theMatch rule introduces two occurrences of somenewnon-logical
elementary atom. For technical convenience, we want to differentiate elementary atoms introduced this way from all other
elementary atoms, and also somehow keep track of the exact origin of each such elementary atom q—that is, rememberwhat
general atom P was replaced by qwhen Match was applied. For this purpose, we extend the language of CL9 by adding to it
a new sort of non-logical atoms, called hybrid. In particular, each hybrid atom is a pair consisting of a general atom P, called
its general component, and a non-logical elementary atom q, called its elementary component. We denote such a pair by
Pq. As we are going to see later, the presence of Pq in a (modiﬁed CL9-) proof will be an indication of the fact that, in the
bottom-up view of proofs, q has been introduced by Match and that, when this happened, the general atom that q replaced
was P.
For similar reasons, we do not want to fully forget the earlier components of sequential subformulas when Switch or
Wait are applied. Hence, we further modify the language of CL9 by requiring that, in every sequential (sub)formula, one of
the components be underlined. With such formulas, applying Switch (in the bottom up view) simply moves the underline
to the next component of a -subformula without deleting the “abandoned” component as was the case in CL9. Similarly
for the effect of (clause 2 of) Wait on -subformulas. The role of an underline is thus to indicate which component of the
sequential subformula would be the head of the corresponding subformula in the corresponding CL9-proof.
The formulas of this extended and modiﬁed language we call hyperformulas. We understand each CL9-formula F as the
hyperformula (and identify F with such) obtained from F by underlining the ﬁrst component of every sequential subformula.
CL9-formulas are thus special cases of hyperformulas where the underlined component of a sequential subformula is always
the leftmost component, and where no hybrid atoms are present.
By the general dehybridization of a hyperformula F we mean the CL9-formula that results from F by replacing in the
latter every hybrid atom by its general component, and removing all underlines in sequential subformulas. Where * is an
interpretation and F is a hyperformula, we deﬁne the game
F*
asG*,whereG is thegeneraldehybridizationof F . Extending theearlier-established lingo tohyperformulas, for ahyperformula
F and an interpretation *, whenever F* = A, we say that * interprets F as A.
By a surface occurrence of a subexpression in a given hyperformula F wemean an occurrence that is not in the scope of
a choice operator, such that, if the subexpression occurs within a component of a sequential subformula, that component is
underlined or occurs earlier than (is to the left of) the underlined component.
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An active occurrence is an occurrence such that, whenever it happens to be within a component of a sequential
subformula, that component is underlined. If an occurrence is within a component of a sequential subformula which (the
component) is to the left of theunderlinedcomponentof the samesubformula, thenwesay that theoccurrence isabandoned.
The termspositive occurrence andnegative occurrence have the samemeanings for hyperformulas as for CL9-formulas.
As in the case ofCL9-formulas, an elementaryhyperformula is one not containing choice operators, sequential operators,
general atoms and hybrid atoms. Thus, ‘elementary hyperformula’ and ‘elementary CL9-formula’ (as well as ‘formula of
classical propositional logic’) mean the same.
We deﬁne the capitalization of a hyperformula F as the result of replacing in it every sequential subformula by its
underlined component, after which all underlines are removed.
The elementarization
‖F‖
of a hyperformula F is the result of replacing, in the capitalization of F , every surface occurrence of the form G1  . . .  Gn by
, every surface occurrence of the form G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by⊥, every positive surface occurrence of each general literal by⊥, and
every surface occurrence of each hybrid atom by the elementary component of that atom.
As in the case of CL9-formulas, we say that a hyperformula F is stable iff its elementarization ‖F‖ is a classical tautology;
otherwise it is instable.
A hyperformula F is said to be balanced iff, for every hybrid atom Pq occurring in F , the following two conditions are
satisﬁed:
(1) F has exactly two occurrences of Pq, where one occurrence is positive and the other occurrence is negative, and both
occurrences are surface occurrences;
(2) the elementary atom q does not occur in F , nor is it the elementary component of any hybrid atom occurring in F other
than Pq.
We say that an active occurrence of a hybrid atom (or the corresponding literal) in a balanced hyperformula iswidowed
iff the other occurrence of the same hybrid atom is abandoned.
6.2. Logic CL9◦
In our soundness proof for CL9 we will employ a “version” of CL9 called CL9◦. Unlike CL9 whose language consists only
of formulas, the language of CL9◦ allows any balanced hyperformulas, which we also refer to as CL9◦-formulas.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Logic CL9◦ is given by the following rules for balanced hyperformulas (below simply referred to as
“(sub)formulas”):
Wait◦: H → F , where F is stable and H is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result
of replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
(2) whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn,
H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Choose◦: H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by Gi for
some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Switch◦: H → F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn
by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Match◦: H → F , where H has two—a positive and a negative—active surface occurrences of some hybrid atom Pq, and F is
the result of replacing in H both occurrences by P.
Lemma 6.2. For any CL9-formula G, if CL9  G, then CL9◦  G.
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that converts any CL9-proof of any formula G into a CL9◦-proof of G.
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Proof. Consider anyCL9-proof tree T forG, i.e., a tree everynodeofwhich is labeledwith aCL9-formula that followsbyone
of the rules ofCL9 from the set of (the labels of) its children,withG sitting at the root. For safety andwithout loss of generality,
we assume that, in the bottom-up view of this proof, Match never introduces an elementary atom that had occurrences in
some earlier formulas (but such occurrences later disappeared due to cutting off the heads of sequential subformulas).
We modify T as follows. First, we underline the heads of all sequential subformulas of all formulas of T . Next, for each
node F of the tree that is derived from its childH byMatch—in particular, whereH is the result of replacing in F a positive and
a negative active surface occurrences of a general atom P by a non-logical elementary atom q—we replace both occurrences
of q by the hybrid atom Pq in H as well as in all of its descendants in the tree. In other words, we turn each application of
Match into the corresponding application of Match◦. Next, we similarly turn each application of Switch into an application
of Switch◦. That is, we modify Switch so that this rule, when moving from a conclusion F to the premise (child) H, simply
moves the underline from a given component to the next component without otherwise deleting any components in the
corresponding -subformula (and, of course, the undeleted old components should also be added to the corresponding
-subformulas in all descendants of H in the tree). Finally, we do the same for Wait whenever it modiﬁes a -subformula. It
is not hard to see that the resulting tree T◦ is a CL9◦-proof of G. 
6.3. Perfect interpretations
An interpretation * is said to be perfect iff it interprets every atom as a constant game. All of our game operations can be
easily seen to preserve the constant property of games (for the non-sequential operations, this was ofﬁcially established in
[5], Theorem 14.1), which means that perfect interpretations interpret all (hyper)formulas as constant games. This fact may
be worth marking as we will often implicitly rely on it. For an interpretation * and valuation e, the perfect interpretation
induced by (*,e) is the interpretation † that interprets each (elementary or general) atom L as the constant game e[L*].
Lemma 6.3. Assume F is any CL9◦-formula, e any valuation, * any interpretation and † the perfect interpretation induced by (*,e).
Then e[F*] = F†.
Proof. Induction on the complexity of F . For an atomic F , e[F*] = F† is immediate. And the inductive step is also
straightforward, taking into account that the operations e[. . .], *, † commute with ¬, ∧ , ∨ ,  , unionsq ,,. 
6.4. Manageability
We continue using our informal jargon introduced in Section 4. Let us further agree, context permitting, to see no
distinction between (hyper)formulas and the games that they would represent once some interpretation was applied to
them.We can say, for example, that “makes a choicemovewithin the subformula E unionsq F of (E unionsq F) ∧ G” tomean thatmakes
the move 1.1 or 1.2 (thus choosing E or F in the ﬁrst ∧-conjunct of the formula/game). For terminological simplicity, wemay
also not always be careful about distinguishing between a subformula and a particular occurrence of it and, for example, say
“active (surface, etc.) subformula E of F” instead of “active occurrence of E in F”. When we use such terminology, we usually
have some run  in mind—the run about the moves of which we are talking. Let us call such a run the contextual run.
Deﬁnition 6.4. Let F be a CL9◦-formula. We say that a run  is F-manageable iff, with  being the contextual run, the
following ﬁve conditions are satisﬁed:
(1) No (choice) moves have been made within active choice subformulas.
(2) If E0 . . .Ei . . .En is an active subformula of F , both of the players have made exactly i switches in this subformula.10
(3) If E0 . . .Ei . . .En is an active subformula of F ,  has made exactly i switches in this subformula, and ⊥ has made ≤ i
switches.
(4) No moves have been made by  within general atoms.
(5) If, for some hybrid atom Pq both of whose occurrences are active, 
+ and − are the sequences of the moves that have
beenmadewithin the positive and the negative occurrence of Pq in F , respectively, then
+ is a-delay (see [16], Section
5) of ¬−.
The above technical concept will play a central role in our soundness proof for CL9. The main intuition here is that, when
 is F-manageable, playing it in no way affects/modiﬁes the choice subgames of the game (clause 1), guarantees that at any
10 According to our terminological conventions, making moves in (a given occurrence of) subformula E0 . . .En means making moves in the (sub)game
represented by this (sub)formula. Note that such a (sub)game does not depend on which of the components of the formula is underlined. So, in the present
context the phrase “this subformula” should be understood as referring to E0 . . .En without regard to where the underline goes. The same applies to
clause 3 of the deﬁnition. And a similar comment should be made for clause 5, where “within …Pq” can or should be understood as “within …P”, as the
game represented by Pq does not depend on q or the presence/absence of it.
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time the underline in a sequential subformula accurately indicates the number of leading switches made therein (clauses
2 and 3), lets the subgames in the “matched” occurrences of atoms evolve to—in a sense—the same games (clause 5), and
makes sure that  does not make any hasty moves in unmatched atoms (clause 4), so that, if and when at some later point
such an atom ﬁnds a match,  will still have a chance to “even out” the corresponding two subgames.
Lemma 6.5. Let E be any CL9◦-formula, * any perfect interpretation, and  an inﬁnite run with arbitrarily long ﬁnite initial
segments that are E-manageable legal positions of E*. Then  is an E-manageable legal run of E*.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. They imply that every ﬁnite initial segment of  is a legal position of E*,
which (by the deﬁnition of “legal run”) means that  is a legal run of E*. Also, obviously  satisﬁes conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Deﬁnition 6.4 because it has arbitrarily long initial segments that satisfy those conditions. So, what remains to show is that
 also satisﬁes condition 5 of Deﬁnition 6.4.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that this is not the case. In particular, let +, − and Pq be as described in the antecedent
of condition 5, and assume that + is not a -delay of ¬−. This means that at least one of the following two statements is
true:
(i) For one of the players ℘, the subsequence of the ℘-labeled moves of + (i.e., the result of deleting in + all ¬℘-labeled
moves) is not the same as that of ¬−, or
(ii) For some k,n, in ¬− the nth -labeled move is made later than the kth ⊥-labeled move, but in + the nth -labeled
move is made earlier than the kth ⊥-labeled move.
Whether (i) or (ii) is the case, it is not hard to see that, beginning from some (ﬁnite) m, every initial segment  of  of
length ≥ m will satisfy the same (i) or (ii) in the role of , and hence  will not be an E-manageable position of E*. This
contradicts the assumptions of our lemma. 
Lemma 6.6. Assume A is a constant static game, ℘ is either player, and , are runs such that  is a ℘-delay of . Then:
(1) If  is a ℘-illegal run of A, then so is .
(2) If  is a ¬℘-illegal run of A, then so is .
Proof. The above is a fact known from [5] (Lemma 4.7). 
Below and later, by saying “℘ makes move α in position ” we mean that such a move is appended to  as a new move.
This creates the new position 〈,℘α〉, which serves as the contextual run when talking about the effects of α or other, earlier
moves of the position.
Lemma 6.7. In each of the following clauses, we assume that E is a CL9◦-formula, * is a perfect interpretation, and  is an
E-manageable legal position of E*.
1. Suppose  makes a move α in position , whose effect is choosing the ith disjunct in an active surface occurrence of a
subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn in E. Of course, such a move is legal.11 Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence by Gi.
Then 〈〉 is an H-manageable legal position of H*, and 〈,α〉E* = 〈〉H*.
2. Suppose  makes a move α in position , whose effect is making a (leading) switch in an active surface occurrence12 of a
subformula
G0 . . .GiGi+1 . . .Gn.
Of course, such a move is legal. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence by
G0 . . .GiGi+1 . . .Gn.
Then 〈,α〉 is an H-manageable legal position of H*, and 〈,α〉E* = 〈,α〉H*.
3. Suppose H is a CL9◦-formula, and it results from E by replacing in it a positive active surface occurrence O+ and a negative
active surface occurrence O− of a general atom P by a hybrid atom Pq. Further assume that π1, . . . ,πn and ν1, . . . ,νm are the
sequences of moves made so far (during playing , that is) by ⊥ within O+ and O−, respectively. Let ′ be the result of adding to
 m moves by  whose effects are making the moves ν1, . . . ,νm in O+, and further adding to the resulting position n moves by 
whose effects are making the moves π1, . . . ,πn in O
−. Then ′ is an H-manageable legal position of H* = E*.
4. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , whose effect is moving within some abandoned occurrence of a subformula
or a widowed occurrence of a hybrid literal. Then 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*.
11 Here and in the subsequent clauses, “legal” should be understandwith respect to E*. That is, “α is a legalmovemade by℘ (in position)”means nothing
but that 〈,℘α〉 is a legal position of E*.
12 Here and in the subsequent clauses, E is the contextual formula. Speciﬁcally, by simply saying “occurrence”, we mean occurrence in E.
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5. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , whose effect is moving in some active surface occurrence of a general atom.
Then 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*.
6. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position,whose effect is making a (catch-up) switch in an active surface occurrence of
a subformula
G0 . . .GiGi+1 . . .Gn.
Then 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*.
7. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , whose effect is making a move γ within an active surface non-widowed
occurrence of a hybrid atom. Let β be the move by  whose effect is making the same move γ within the other active surface
occurrence of the same hybrid atom. Then 〈,⊥α,β〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*.
8. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , whose effect is choosing the ith conjunct in an active surface occurrence of
a subformula G1  . . .  Gn. Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence by Gi. Then 〈〉 is an H-manageable legal
position of H*, and 〈,⊥α〉E* = 〈〉H*.
9. Suppose ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , whose effect is making a (leading) switch in an active surface occurrence of
a subformula
G0 . . .GiGi+1 . . .Gn.
Let H be the result of replacing in E the above occurrence by
G0 . . .GiGi+1 . . .Gn.
Then 〈,⊥α,α〉 is an H-manageable legal position of H*, and 〈,⊥α,α〉E* = 〈,⊥α,α〉H*.
10. If ⊥ makes a legal move α in position , then it satisﬁes the conditions of one of the clauses 4–9.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma and, in addition, when discussing each clause of the lemma, assume the
additional conditions of that clause.
Clause 1. It is not hard to see that each of the ﬁve conditions of Deﬁnition 6.4 is inherited by H and  from E and . This
means that 〈〉 is H-manageable. The fact 〈,α〉E* = 〈〉H* is also obvious, as the effect of (the clearly legal) move α in
〈〉E* is turning the (G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn)* component of the latter into G*i , i.e., turning E* into H*.
Clause 2. As in the previous clause, with a little thought one can see that each of the ﬁve conditions of Deﬁnition 6.4 is
inherited by H and 〈,α〉 from E and , so 〈,α〉 is H-manageable. As for 〈,α〉’s being a legal position of H* and the fact
〈,α〉E* = 〈,α〉H*, it is sufﬁcient to note that we simply have E* = H*.
Clause 3. Let
+ = 〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn,ν1, . . . ,νm〉
and
− = 〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm,π1, . . . ,πn〉.
Thus, + and − are the sequences of all moves made by the two players within O+ and O−, respectively, while playing ′
(here the contextual run). Note that
+ is a -delay of ¬−. (11)
This implies that ′ is H-manageable, because conditions 1–4 of Deﬁnition 6.4 are obviously inherited by H and ′ from E
and , and so is condition 5 for any active hybrid atom Rs different from Pq.
We, of course, have H* = E*. So, what remains to show is that ′ is a legal position of E*. The assumption that  is a legal
position of E* obviously implies that:
〈⊥π1, . . . ,⊥πn〉 is a legal position of P*; (12)
〈⊥ν1, . . . ,⊥νm〉 is a legal position of ¬P*. (13)
Assume, for a contradiction, that ′ is not a legal position of E*. Evidently this can be the case only if either + is not a
legal position of P* or − is not a legal position of ¬P* (or both).
Suppose + is not a legal position of P*. In view of (12), + cannot be a ⊥-illegal position of P*. So, it must be -illegal.
But then, by (11) and clause 1 of Lemma 6.6, ¬− is a -illegal position of P*, meaning that− is a ⊥-illegal position of ¬P*.
This, however, is in obvious contradiction with (13).
Suppose now − is not a legal position of ¬P*. This case is similar/symmetric to the previous one. In view of (13), −
cannot be a ⊥-illegal position of ¬P*. So, it must be -illegal, which means that ¬− is a ⊥-illegal position of P*. But then,
by (11) and clause 2 of Lemma 6.6, + is a ⊥-illegal position of P*. This, however, is in contradiction with (12).
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Clauses 4,5,6,7 are obvious.
Clause 8 is symmetric to Clause 1.
Clause 9 is similar to Clause 2.
Clause 10 is obvious. 
6.5. Finalization
Note that when a formula E is elementary and an interpretation * is perfect, E* is one of the two constant elementary
games  or ⊥. Here we deﬁne the relation ≤ on constant elementary games by stipulating that A ≤ B iff A = ⊥ or B = . In
other words, A ≤ B iff (A → B) = .
Lemma 6.8. Suppose * is a perfect interpretation, F1 is an elementary formula, and F2 is the result of replacing in F1 a positive
occurrence of an (elementary) literal L1 by an elementary (logical or non-logical) literal L2, such that L
*
1
≤ L*
2
. Then F
*
1
≤ F*
2
.
Proof. The above lemma does nothing but rephrases, in our terms, a known fact from classical logic, according to which, if
in an interpreted formula F1 we replace a positive occurrence of a subformula L1 by a formula L2 whose Boolean value is not
less than that of L1 (L2 is “at least as true” as L1), then the value of the resulting formula F2 will not be less than that of F1 (F2
will not be “less true” than F1). 
Now we introduce the operation 〈〉↓A of the type
{runs}×{constant games} → {constant elementary games},
which is rather similar to preﬁxation. Intuitively 〈〉↓A, that we call the -ﬁnalization of A, is the proposition “ is a -won
run of A”. This operation is only deﬁned when  is a legal run of A. We agree that, every time we make a statement that
applies 〈〉↓ to a constant game A, we imply that  is a legal run of A and hence 〈〉↓A is deﬁned. Here is the formal deﬁnition
of the operation of ﬁnalization:
Deﬁnition 6.9. Assume A is a constant game and  a legal run of A. Then 〈〉↓A is the constant elementary game deﬁned by
Wn〈〉↓A〈〉 = WnA〈〉.
Lemma 6.10. Assume E is a stable CL9◦-formula, * is a perfect interpretation, and  is an E-manageable legal run of E*. Then 
is a -won run of E*.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Throughout this proof,  is the contextual run.
For each (positive) active surface occurrence of each general or hybrid literal in E, let us ﬁx an elementary non-logical atom
that we call the surrogate for that occurrence. We assume that all surrogates are pairwise distinct, and none of them occurs
in E (either directly or as the elementary component of a hybrid atom). Since these atoms do not occur in E, we may make
an arbitrary assumption regarding how they are interpreted by * (otherwise replace * by an appropriate interpretation). In
particular, we assume that, whenever r is the surrogate for an active occurrence O of a general or hybrid literal L, we have
r* = 〈〉↓L*, where  is the sequence of (lab)moves made within that occurrence.
Let E1 denote the result of replacing in the capitalization of E:
• every positive surface occurrence of a general or hybrid literal by its surrogate;
• every surface occurrence of a subformula of the form H1  . . .  Hn by ;
• every surface occurrence of a subformula of the form H1 unionsq . . . unionsq Hn by ⊥.
With some thought, we can see that
〈〉↓E* = E*
1
. (14)
Assume E has k active, positive, non-widowed hybrid atoms, where q1, . . . ,qk are the elementary components of those
atoms and P1, . . . ,Pk are the corresponding general components. Let r1, . . . ,rk be the surrogates for the positive occurrences
of P1
q1
, . . . ,Pk
qk
, respectively, and let+
1
, . . . ,+
k
be the sequences of moves that have beenmade (while playing ) within these
k occurrences. Next, let s1, . . . ,sk be the surrogates for the occurrences of ¬P1q1 , . . . ,¬Pkqk , respectively, and let 
−
1
, . . . ,−
k
be
the sequences of moves that have been made within these k occurrences. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 each atom si
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) by ¬ri. According to clause 5 of Deﬁnition 6.4, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, +i is a -delay of ¬−i . Hence, as P*i is a static
game, we have 〈¬−
i
〉↓P*
i
≤ 〈+
i
〉↓P*
i
, which is the same as to say that ¬(〈+
i
〉↓P*
i
) ≤ ¬(〈¬−
i
〉↓P*
i
). But, by the deﬁnition
of ¬, ¬(〈¬−
i
〉↓P*
i
) = 〈−
i
〉↓¬P*
i
. So, ¬(〈+
i
〉↓P*
i
) ≤ 〈−
i
〉↓¬P*
i
. Now remember that 〈+
i
〉↓P*
i
= r*
i
and 〈−
i
〉↓¬P*
i
= s*
i
. Thus,
¬r*
i
≤ s*
i
. Then, applying Lemma 6.8 k times, we get
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E
*
2
≤ E*
1
. (15)
Next, let E3 be the result of replacing in E2 each surrogate for a general literal by ⊥. Applying Lemma 6.8 as many times
as the number of such surrogates, we get
E
*
3
≤ E*
2
. (16)
Now compare E3 with ‖E‖. An analysis of how these two formulas have been obtained from E can reveal that E3 is just
the result of replacing in ‖E‖ all (both) occurrences of each atom qi from the earlier-mentioned list q1, . . . ,qk by ri. That is, E3
is a substitutional instance of ‖E‖. The latter is classically valid because, by our assumptions, E is stable. Therefore E3 is also
classically valid, and hence E
*
3
= . Then statements (16), (15) and (14) yield 〈〉↓E* = . In other words,  is a -won run
of E*. 
7. The soundness of CL9
Lemma 7.1. If CL9  F , then F is valid (any formula F).
Moreover, there is an effective procedure that takes a CL9-proof of an arbitrary formula F and returns an HPMH such that, for
every interpretation *, H computes F*.
Proof. According to Theorem 4.4, our sequential operations preserve the static property of games. The same is
known to be true for all other operations studied in computability logic (Theorem 24 of [16]). So, for any formula F and
interpretation *, the game F* is static. Further, it is known that, for static games, HPMs and EPMs have the same computing
power, and that, moreover, every EPM can be effectively converted into an HPM such that the latter wins every static game
won by the former (Theorem 28 of [16]). Therefore, it would be sufﬁcient to prove the above lemma—in particular, the
‘Moreover’ clause of it—with “EPM S” instead of “HPMH”.
Furthermore, it would be sufﬁcient to restrict interpretations to perfect ones. Indeed, suppose a machineM (whether it
be an EPM or an HPM) wins F† for every perfect interpretation †, and let * be a not-necessarily perfect interpretation. We
want to see that the same machine M also wins F*. Suppose this is not the case, i.e., M loses F* on some valuation e. This
means that, where  is the run spelled by some e-computation branch of M, we have Wne[F*]〈〉 = ⊥. Now, let † be the
perfect interpretation induced by (*,e). According to Lemma 6.3, e[F*] = F†. Thus,WnF† 〈〉 = ⊥, so that M does not win F†,
which is a contradiction.
Finally, Lemma 6.2 allows us to safely replace “CL9” by “CL9◦” in our present lemma.
In view of the above observations, Lemma 7.1 is an immediate consequence of the following Lemma 7.2. 
Lemma 7.2. There is an effective procedure that takes a CL9◦-proof of an arbitrary formula F and returns an EPM S such that, for
every perfect interpretation *, S computes F*.
Proof. Every CL9◦-proof, in fact, encodes a valuation- and interpretation-independent winning strategy for , and the
EPM S that we are going to describe just follows such a strategy.
We provide only a semiformal description of how our strategy/machine S works for a CL9◦-provable formula F . Restoring
suppressed technical details, if necessary, does not present a problem.13 Fix an arbitrary valuation e and a perfect interpreta-
tion *. Since * is perfect, the e parameter is irrelevant and it can always be safely omitted. Furthermore, in concordance with
our earlier agreements, we will often omit * as well and write E instead of E*. That is, we continue abusing terminology and
notation by (often) identifying game E* with formula E.
The strategy that our S follows is a recursive one, at every step dealing with 〈〉E*, where E is a CL9◦-provable formula
and  is an E-manageable legal position of E*. Initially E = F and  = 〈〉. How S acts on 〈〉E* depends on by which of the
four rules E is derived in CL9◦ (some CL9◦-proof is assumed to be ﬁxed).
If E is derived by Choose◦ from H as described in Deﬁnition 6.1, S makes the move α whose effect is choosing Gi in the
G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn subformula of E. For example, if E = (G1 unionsq G2) ∧ (G3  G4) and H = G2 ∧ (G3  G4), then ‘1.2’ is such a move α.
Clause 1 of Lemma 6.7 tells us that remains anH-manageable legal position ofH* and thatα brings 〈〉E* down to 〈〉H*.
So, after making move α, S switches to its strategy for 〈〉H*. This, by the induction hypothesis, guarantees success.
If E is derived by Switch◦ from H as described in Deﬁnition 6.1, then S makes the move α whose effect is making a switch
in the G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn subformula. For example, if E = (G0G1G2) ∧ (G3G4) and H = (G0G1G2) ∧ (G3G4),
then ‘1.§’ is such a move. Clause 2 of Lemma 6.7 tells us that 〈,α〉 remains an H-manageable legal position of H* and that
α brings 〈〉E* down to 〈,α〉H*. So, after making move α, the machine switches to its strategy for 〈,α〉H* and, by the
induction hypothesis, wins.
If E is derived byMatch◦ fromH through replacing the two (active surface) occurrences of a hybrid atom Pq inH by P, then
the machine ﬁnds within  and copies, in the positive occurrence of Pq, all of the moves made so far by the environment in
the negative occurrence of Pq (or rather in the corresponding occurrence of P), and vice versa. This series of moves brings
13 A similar proof for CL2 given in [6] was not lazy to go into all technical details, for which reason it was much longer than the present proof.
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the game down to 〈′〉E* = 〈′〉H*, where ′ is result of adding those moves to . Clause 3 of Lemma 6.7 guarantees that ′
is an H-manageable legal position of H*. So, now S switches to its successful strategy for 〈′〉H* and eventually wins.
Finally, suppose E is derived by Wait◦. Our machine keeps granting permission (“waiting”). In view of Lemma 6.10, if ⊥
never makes a move, S wins the game. Suppose now⊥makes a move α. This should be a legal move, or else S automatically
wins. Then, according to clause 10 of Lemma 6.7, α should satisfy the conditions of one of the following six cases.
Case 1. α is a move whose effect is moving in some abandoned subformula or a widowed hybrid literal of E. According to
clause 4 of Lemma 6.7, 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*. In this case, S calls itself on 〈,⊥α〉E*.
Case 2. α is a move whose effect is moving in some active surface occurrence of a general atom in E. According to clause
5 of Lemma 6.7, 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*. Again, in this case, S calls itself on 〈,⊥α〉E*.
Case 3. α is a move whose effect is making a catch-up switch in some active surface occurrence of a -subformula.
According to clause 6 of Lemma 6.7, 〈,⊥α〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*. In this case, as in the previous two
cases, S calls itself on 〈,⊥α〉E*.
Case 4. α is a move whose effect is making a move γ in some active surface occurrence of a non-widowed hybrid atom.
Let β be the move whose effect is making the same move γ within the other active surface occurrence of the same hybrid
atom. According to clause 7 of Lemma 6.7, 〈,⊥α,β〉 remains an E-manageable legal position of E*. In this case, S makes the
move β and calls itself on 〈,⊥α,β〉E*.
Case 5: α is a move whose effect is a choice of the ith component in an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G1  . . .  Gn. Then S switches to its winning strategy for 〈〉H*, where H is the result of replacing the above subformula
by Gi in E. Clause 8 of Lemma 6.7 guarantees that 〈〉H* is indeed the game to which 〈〉E* has evolved and that  is an
H-manageable legal position of H*, so that, by the induction hypothesis, S knows how to win 〈〉H*.
Case 6: α signiﬁes a (leading) switch move within an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Then S makes the same move α (signifying making a catch-up switch within the same subformula), and calls itself on
〈,⊥α,α〉H*, where H is the result of replacing the above subformula by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Clauseof 9 Lemma6.7guarantees that 〈,⊥α,α〉 is anH-manageable legal positionofH*, so that, by the inductionhypothesis,
S will win 〈,⊥α,α〉H*.
Looking back atS ’s strategy, the value of E keeps changing from conclusion to a premise, starting from the original formula
F . It is therefore obvious that such a value should stabilize at some Eﬁnal and never change afterwards. It is also obvious
that this Eﬁnal should be derived by Wait
◦, or else it would further change. For the same reason, while S acts following the
prescriptions for the case of Wait◦ with E = Eﬁnal, Cases 5 and 6 never occur. But in all other four cases, as well as in the
case when ⊥ does not make any moves, (the perhaps continuously updated)  remains Eﬁnal-manageable, and—according
to Lemma 6.5— will remain so even if it grows inﬁnite. Also, as a conclusion of Wait, Eﬁnal is stable. This, by Lemma 6.10,
implies that the overall game will be won by S .
To ofﬁcially complete our proof of the lemma, it remains to note that S , of course, can be constructed effectively from a
given CL9◦-proof of F . 
8. Preliminaries for the completeness proof
8.1. Machines against machines
This subsection borrows a discussion from [6], providing certain background information necessary for our completeness
proof but missing in [16], the only external source on computability logic on which the present paper was promised to rely.
For a run  and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells  iff B spells ¬ ( with all labels
reversed) in the sense of Section 6 of [16]. Intuitively, when a machine M plays as ⊥ (rather than ), then the run that is
generated by a given computation branch B ofM is the run cospelled (rather than spelled) by B, for themoves thatMmakes
get the label ⊥, and the moves that its adversary makes get the label .
We say that an EPM E is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch of E is fair in the sense of Section 6 of
[16].
Lemma 8.1. Assume E is a fair EPM, H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There are a uniquely deﬁned e-computation branch
BE of E and a uniquely deﬁned e-computation branch BH ofH—which we, respectively, call the (E ,e,H)-branch and the (H,e,E)-
branch—such that the run spelled by BH, called theH vs. E run on e, is the run cospelled by BE .
When H,E ,e are as above,  is the H vs. E run on e and A is a game withWnAe 〈〉 =  (resp.WnAe 〈〉 = ⊥), we say that H
wins (resp. loses) A against E on e.
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A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [5] (Lemma 20.4), and we will not reproduce the formal proof here.
Instead, the following intuitive explanation should sufﬁce.
Proof idea. AssumeH, E , e are as in Lemma 8.1. The play that we are going to describe is the unique play generated when
the two machines play against each other, withH in the role of , E in the role of ⊥, and e spelled on the valuation tapes of
both machines. We can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the processH remains inactive (sleeping); it is
woken up only when E enters a permission state, on which eventHmakes a (one single) transition to its next computation
step—that may ormay not result in making amove—and goes back into a sleep that will continue until E enters a permission
state again, and so on. From E ’s perspective, H acts as a patient adversary who makes one or zero move only when granted
permission, just as the EPM-model assumes. And fromH’s perspective, which, like a person in a coma, has no sense of time
during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events that it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant
rate, E acts as an adversary who canmake any ﬁnite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e., whileHwas sleeping), just as
theHPM-model assumes. This scenario uniquely determines an e-computation branchBE of E thatwe call the (E ,e,H)-branch,
and an e-computation branch BH ofH that we call the (H,e,E)-branch. What we call theH vs. E run on e is the run generated
in this play. In particular—since we let H play in the role of —this is the run spelled by BH. E , who plays in the role of ⊥,
sees the same run, only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in negative colors. That is, BE cospells rather than spells
that run. This is exactly what Lemma 8.1 asserts. 
8.2. Logics CL10, CL10◦ and CL10◦
Our proof of the completeness part of Theorem 5.7 employs the conservative, elementary-base fragment CL10 of CL9,
obtainedby restricting the languageof the latter toelementary-base formulas—werefer to formulasof this restricted language
asCL10-formulas—and (correspondingly) deleting the rule ofMatch. LogicCL1, historically the ﬁrst system for computability
logic proven (in [6]) to be sound and complete, is a ,-free counterpart of CL10. Of course, CL10 inherits soundness from
CL9. In this section we are going to prove the completeness of CL10.
Our completeness proof for CL10, in turn, employs the modiﬁcation CL10◦ of CL10. CL10◦-formulas are nothing but
elementary-base CL9◦-formulas, i.e., CL9◦-formulas that contain no general or hybrid atoms. Thus, the only difference
between CL10-formulas and CL10◦-formulas is that, in the latter one of the components of each sequential subformula
is underlined.
Logic CL10◦ is a conservative fragment of logic CL9◦ in the same sense as CL10 is a fragment of CL9. Namely, CL10◦
is obtained from CL9◦ by restricting its language to elementary-base formulas, and deleting the rule of Match◦. Here we
(re)produce the rules of CL10◦ for the convenience of later references:
Deﬁnition 8.2. The inference rules of CL10◦ are:
Wait◦: H  F , where F is stable and H is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result
of replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn,
H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Choose◦: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by Gi for
some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Switch◦: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn
by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
The following lemma establishes equivalence between CL10 and CL10◦.
Lemma 8.3. For any formula G, CL10◦  G iff CL10  G.
Proof. This lemma is pretty straightforward: a CL10◦-proof of G turns into a CL10-proof of G after replacing, in each
formula of the former, every subformula E1 . . .Em . . .En by Em . . .En and every subformula E1 . . .Em . . .En by
Em . . .En. And vice versa: a CL10-proof of G turns into a CL10◦-proof of G after underlining the head of each sequential
subformula of G. Then, in the bottom up view of the proof, every time Switch is used, it should simply move the underline
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to the next sequential component instead of deleting the head. Similarly for the premises of Wait that are associated with
sequential subformulas. 
Next, we deﬁne Logic CL10◦ which is a “dual” of CL10◦.
Deﬁnition 8.4. The language of CL10◦ is the same as that of CL10◦, and the rules of inference are:
Wait◦: H  F , where F is instable and H is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following two conditions:
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result
of replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn,
H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Choose◦: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn by Gi for
some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Switch◦: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn
by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Lemma 8.5. CL10◦  F iff CL10◦  F (any CL10◦-formula F).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of F . It would be sufﬁcient to verify the ‘only if’ part, as the
‘if’ part (which we do not need anyway) can be handled in a fully symmetric way. So, assume CL10◦  F and let us see that
then CL10◦  F . There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: F is stable. Then there must be a CL10◦-unprovable formula H satisfying one of the following two conditions, for
otherwise F would be CL10◦-derivable by Wait◦:
• H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
• H is the result of replacing in F an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn
by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
In either case, by the induction hypothesis, CL10◦  H, whence, by Choose◦ (if the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed) or Switch◦ (if
the second condition is satisﬁed), CL10◦  F .
Case 2: F is instable. Let H be the smallest set of formulas such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result of
replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
• whenever F has an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn,
H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
None of the elements of H is provable in CL10◦, for otherwise F would also be derivable in CL10◦ by Choose◦ or Switch◦.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, each element of H is CL10◦-provable, whence, by Wait◦, we have CL10◦  F . 
8.3. The completeness of CL10
Lemma 8.6. If CL10  F , then F is not valid (any CL10-formula F).
In particular, if CL10  F , then F* is not computable for some interpretation * that interprets all atoms as ﬁnitary predicates of
complexity 2.
1466 G. Japaridze / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 1443–1475
Proof. Assume CL10  F , which, by Lemmas 8.3 and 8.5, means that CL10◦  F . Fix a CL10◦-proof of F . From such a proof,
we can extract an environment’s interpretation- and valuation-independent EPM-counterstrategy C for F in a way fully
symmetric to the way we extracted the machine’s strategy S from a CL9◦-proof in Section 7. C is a counterstrategy in the
sense that C plays in the role of⊥ rather than.14 In fact, C is much simpler than S , because in the present case we only deal
with elementary-base formulas. Since the work of C depends neither on * nor on e, in our description of it we can safely omit
these parameters, and write E instead of e[E*].
The strategy that C follows is a recursive one which, just like its counterpart from Section 7, at every step deals with 〈〉E,
where E is some formula from the CL10◦-proof of F , and  is a certain legal position of E. Initially E = F and  = 〈〉. How C
acts on 〈〉E depends on by which of the three rules E is derived in CL10◦.
If E is derived by Choose◦ from H as described in Deﬁnition 8.4, C makes the move α whose effect is choosing Gi in the
G1  . . .  Gn subformula of E. Then it updates E to H (without changing ), and calls (repeats) itself.
If E is derived by Switch◦ from H as described in Deﬁnition 8.4, then C makes the move α whose effect is making a switch
in the G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn component, updates E to H (without changing ), and calls itself.
Finally, suppose E is derived byWait◦. C keeps granting permission. Now and then the adversarymay bemakingmoves in
abandoned components, or catch-up switch moves within sequential subformulas. To such moves C reacts by adding them
to its internal record of  (updating ), but otherwise C does not move. However, what will typically happen during this
stage (except one—the last—case) is that sooner or later the adversary makes a legal move α15 that causes C to update E to
one of its premises. In particular, one of the following will be the case:
Case 1: α is a move signifying a choice of the ith component in an active surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn.
Then C updates E to the result of replacing in E the above subformula by Gi (without changing ), and calls itself.
Case 2: α is a move signifying a switch in an active surface occurrence of a subformula
G0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn.
Then Cmakes the samemove α, updates E to the result of replacing in it the above subformula byG0 . . .GmGm+1 . . .Gn,
updates  to 〈,⊥α,α〉, and calls itself.
As we can see from the above description, the value of E starts with F and, moving up along one of the branches of the
CL10◦-proof of F , eventually stabilizes at E = Eﬁnal for one of the instable formulas of the proof (Eﬁnal is instable because it
is the conclusion of Wait◦). Call such a formula Eﬁnal the limit formula of the given play. Of course, C is a fair EPM because
it will grant permission inﬁnitely many times after reaching the limit formula.
For reasons fully symmetric to those that we relied upon in Section 7, at each step of the work of C, 〈〉E can be seen to
be exactly the game to which the original game F has been brought down in the play. So, where ﬁnal is the ﬁnal value of
, C will be the winner in the overall play over F iff ﬁnal is a ⊥-won run of Eﬁnal . More precisely, for any given valuation
e and interpretation * (the parameters that we have been suppressing so far), the overall play over e[F*] is won by C iff
ﬁnal is a⊥-won run of e[E*ﬁnal]. Next, taking into account thatﬁnal only contains (the meaningless) moves in abandoned
components and catch-up switches, with some thought one can see that ﬁnal is a ⊥-won run of e[E*ﬁnal] if and only if
‖Eﬁnal‖* is false at e.
Of course, different’s strategies (HPMs)H and different valuations emay yield different runs and hence induce different
limit formulas. So, our goal now is to select an interpretation * such that, for any HPM H, there is a valuation e at which
‖Eﬁnal‖* is false, where Eﬁnal is the limit formula of the play of H against C on valuation e. This would mean that no HPM
can win F* against C.
Let us ﬁx some standard way of describing HPMs, and let
H1,H2,H3, . . .
be the list of all HPMs arranged according to the lexicographic order of their descriptions, so that each constant c can be
considered the code ofHc . Next, we ﬁx a variable x and agree that, for each constant c,
ec
is the valuation with ec(x) = c (and, say, ec(y) = 1 for any other variable y = x). Further,
Lc
will denote the limit formula of the game over F betweenHc , in the role of , and our C, in the role of ⊥, on valuation ec . In
more precise terms, Lc is the limit formula induced by theHc vs. C run on ec (remember Lemma 8.1).
Finally, let
G1, . . . ,Gk
14 If we want to see C as a strategy in the ordinary sense, then it is a strategy for ¬F .
15 And if α is illegal, then C’s job is done.
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be all (instable) formulas from the CL10◦-proof of F that are obtained by Wait◦. For each such Gi, we ﬁx a classical model
(true/false assignment for atoms)Mi such that
Mi makes the elementarization of Gi false.
And, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, we deﬁne the predicate Ti by
Ti is true at a valuation e iff Le(x) = Gi.
Now we deﬁne the interpretation * by stipulating that, for each atom p,
p* = ∨{Ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, p is true in Mi}
(∨F means the ∨-disjunction of all elements of F , understood as ⊥ when the set F is empty.)
Consider an arbitrary c ∈ {1,2, . . .}. As noted earlier, we must have Lc = Gj for one of the j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. Fix this j. Observe
that, at valuation ec , Tj is true and all other Ti (i = j, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) are false. With this fact in mind, it is easy to see that, for every
atom p, p is true in Mj iff the predicate p
* is true at ec . This obviously extends from atoms to their ¬, ∧ ,∨-combinations, so
that ‖Gj‖ is true in Mj iff the predicate ‖Gj‖* is true at ec . And, by our choice of the models Mi, the formula ‖Gj‖, i.e., ‖Lc‖, is
false in Mj . Consequently, ‖Lc‖* is false at ec . But Lc is the limit formula of the play between H and C on ec and, as we noted
earlier, the fact that ‖Lc‖* is false at ec implies thatH loses F* against C on valuation ec .
Thus, no Hc computes F*, meaning that F* is not computable, because every HPM is Hc for some c. Note also that, as
promised in the lemma, the predicate p* (any atom p) is ﬁnitary as only the value assigned to xmatters. To ofﬁcially complete
the present proof, it remains to show that
the complexity of p* is 2 (any atom p). (17)
Remember that an arithmetical predicate A(c) (with c here seen as a variable) is said to have complexity 2 iff it can
be written as ∃x∀yB(c,x,y) for some decidable predicate B(c,x,y); and A(c) is of complexity 2 iff both A(c) and ¬A(c) are of
complexity 2.
We deﬁned p* as a disjunction of some Ti, that we now think of as unary arithmetical predicates and write as Ti(c).
Disjunction is known to preserve 2—as well as 2 — complexity, so, in order to verify (17), it would be sufﬁcient to show
that each Ti(c) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is of complexity2. Looking at themeaning of Ti(c), this predicate asserts nothing but that the value
of C’s internal record of E in the process of playing the (C,ec ,Hc)-branch (see Lemma 8.1)—call this branch Bc—will stabilize
at Gi. So, Ti(c) can be written as ∃x∀y(y ≥ x → Ki(c,y)), where Ki(c,y) means “the value of record E at the yth computation
step of branch Bc is Gi”. Furthermore, we know that the value of E should indeed stabilize at one of the instable formulas
G1, . . . ,Gk of the proof. Hence, ¬Ti(c) is equivalent to ∨{Tj(c) | 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j = i}. Consequently, in order to show that each Ti(c)
is of complexity 2, it would sufﬁce to show that each Ti(c) is of complexity 2. For the latter, in turn, verifying that Ki(c,y)
is a decidable predicate would be sufﬁcient. But Ki(c,y) is indeed decidable. A decision procedure for it ﬁrst constructs the
machineHc from number c. Then it lets this machine play against C on valuation ec as described in the proof idea for Lemma
8.1. In particular, it traces, in parallel, how the conﬁgurations of the two machines evolve up to the yth computation step of
C, i.e., its yth conﬁguration. Then the procedure looks at the value of record E in that conﬁguration, and says “yes” or “no”
depending on whether the latter is Gi or not. 
9. The completeness of CL9
Lemma 9.1. If CL9  F , then F is not valid (any CL9-formula F).
Moreover, if CL9  F , then F* is not computable for some interpretation * that interprets all elementary atoms of F as ﬁnitary
predicates of arithmetical complexity2, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems of the form (A
1
1
unionsq . . . unionsq A1m)  . . .  (Am1 unionsq
. . . unionsq Amm), where each Aji is a ﬁnitary predicate of arithmetical complexity 2.
Proof idea. We are going to show that if CL9  F , then there is a CL10-formula F of the same form as F that is not
provable in CL10. Precisely, “the same form as F” here means that F is the result of rewriting/expanding in F every general
atom P as a certain elementary-base formula Pˇunionsq . This, in view of the already known completeness of CL10, immediately
yields non-validity for F . As it turns out, the above formulas Pˇunionsq , that we call molecules, can be chosen to be as simple as
sufﬁciently long -conjunctions of sufﬁciently long unionsq-disjunctions of arbitrary “neutral” (not occurring in F and pairwise
distinct) elementary atoms, with the “sufﬁcient length” of those conjunctions/disjunctions being bounded by the number
of occurrences of general atoms in F .
Intuitively, the reason why CL10  F, i.e., why cannot win (the game represented by) F, is that a smart environment
may start choosing different conjuncts/disjuncts in different occurrences of Pˇunionsq . The best that  can do in such a play is
to match any given positive or negative occurrence of Pˇunionsq with one (but not more!) negative or positive occurrence of the
same subgame—match in the sense that mimic environment’s moves in order to keep the subgames/subformulas at the two
occurrences identical. Yet, this is insufﬁcient for to achieve a guaranteed success. This is so because’s matching decisions
for F could be modeled by appropriate applications of the rule of Match in an attempted CL9-proof for F , and so can be—
through the rules of Wait, Choose and Switch — either player’s decisions required by choice and sequential connectives in
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the non-molecule parts of F. A winning strategy (CL10-proof) for F would then translate into a CL9-proof for F , which,
however, does not exist.
Proof. Fix a CL9-formula F . Let P be the set of all general atoms occurring in F . Let us ﬁx m as the total number of
occurrences of such atoms in F;16 if there are fewer than 2 of such occurrences, then we takem = 2.
For the rest of this section, let us agree that
a,b always range over {1, . . . ,m}.
For each P ∈ P and each a,b, let us ﬁx an elementary atom
• Pˇa
b
not occurring in F . We assume that Pˇa
b
= Qˇ c
d
as long as either P = Q or a = c or b = d. Note that the Pˇa
b
are elementary atoms
despite our “tradition” according to which the capital letters P,Q , . . . stand for general atoms.
Next, for each P ∈ P and each a, we deﬁne
• Pˇaunionsq = Pˇa1 unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇam.
Finally, for each P ∈ P , we deﬁne
• Pˇunionsq = Pˇ1unionsq  . . .  Pˇmunionsq , i.e., Pˇunionsq =
(
Pˇ1
1
unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇ1m
)
 . . . 
(
Pˇm
1
unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇmm
)
.
We refer to the above formulas Pˇa
b
, Pˇaunionsq and Pˇunionsq asmolecules, in particular, P-basedmolecules. To differentiate between the
three sorts of molecules, we call the molecules of the type Pˇa
b
small, call the molecules of the type Pˇaunionsq medium, and call the
molecules of the type Pˇunionsq large. Thus, where k is the cardinality of P , altogether there are k large molecules, k ×m medium
molecules and k ×m×m small molecules.
For simplicity, for the rest of this section we assume/pretend that the languages of CL9 and CL10 have no non-logical
atoms other than those occurring in F plus the atoms Pˇba (P ∈ P , a,b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). This way the scope of the term “formula”
is correspondingly redeﬁned.
An occurrence of a moleculeM in a formula can be positive or negative. While a positive occurrence literally meansM, a
negative occurrence looks like ¬M, which—unlessM is a small molecule—should be considered a standard abbreviation. For
example, a negative occurrence of the medium molecule Pˇa
1
unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇam is nothing but an (“ordinary”, positive) occurrence of
¬Pˇa
1
 . . .  ¬Pˇam. One should be especially careful when applying the terms “positive occurrence” and “negative occurrence”
to small molecules, as here the meaning of our terminology somewhat diverges from its earlier-used meaning for atoms.
Speciﬁcally, a positive occurrence of a small molecule Pˇa
b
means—as expected—an occurrence that comes without ¬ in the
formula. As for a negative occurrence of themolecule Pˇa
b
(as opposed to the atom Pˇa
b
), itmeans an occurrence of the subformula
¬Pˇa
b
rather than just the Pˇa
b
part of it under ¬. So, for example, the result of replacing the negative occurrence of Pˇa
b
by Q in
the formula E ∨ ¬Pˇa
b
is the formula E ∨ Q rather than E ∨ ¬Q , as ¬ was a part of what we call a “negative occurrence of Pˇa
b
”.
Let us say that a (positive or negative) occurrence of a molecule in a given CL10-formula is independent iff it is not a part
of another (“larger”) molecule. For example, the negative occurrence of the medium molecule Pˇ1
1
unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇ1m in the following
formula is independent while its positive occurrence is not:(
¬Pˇ11  . . .  ¬Pˇ1m
)
∨
((
Pˇ11 unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇ1m
)
 . . . 
(
Pˇm1 unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇmm
))
.
Of course, surface occurrences of molecules are always independent, and so are any—surface or non-surface—occurrences
of large molecules.
We say that a CL10-formula E is good iff the following conditions are satisﬁed:
Condition (i): E contains at mostm independent occurrences of molecules.
Condition (ii): Only large molecules (may) have independent non-surface occurrences in E.
Condition (iii): Each small molecule has at most one positive and at most one negative independent occurrence in E.
Condition (iv): For eachmediummolecule Pˇaunionsq, E has atmost one positive independent occurrence of Pˇaunionsq, andwhen E has such
an occurrence, then for no b does E have a positive independent occurrence of the small molecule Pˇa
b
.
Let E be a CL10-formula. By an isolated small molecule of E (or E-isolated small molecule, or a small molecule isolated
in E) we will mean a small molecule that has exactly one independent occurrence in E. We will say that such a molecule is
positive or negative depending on whether its independent occurrence in E is positive or negative.
Next, the ﬂooriﬁcation of E, denoted
 E",
16 In fact, a much smallermwould be sufﬁcient for our purposes. E.g.,m can be chosen to be such that no given general atom hasmore thanm occurrences
in F . But why try to economize?
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is the result of replacing in E every positive (resp. negative) independent occurrence of every P-based (each P ∈ P) large,
medium and E-isolated small molecule17 by the general literal P (resp. ¬P).
Claim 1. For any good CL10-formula E, if CL10  E, then CL9   E".
To prove this claim, assume E is a good CL10-formula, and CL10  E. By induction on the length of the CL10-proof of E, we
want to show that CL9   E". We need to consider the following three cases, depending on which of the three rules of CL10
was used (last) to derive E.
Case 1: E is derived by Wait. Let us ﬁx the set H of premises of E. Each formula H ∈ H is provable in CL10. Hence, by the
induction hypothesis, we have:
For any H ∈ H, if H is good, then CL9   H". (18)
We consider the following three subcases. The ﬁrst two subcases are not mutually exclusive, and either one can be
chosen when both of them apply. Speciﬁcally, Subcase 1.1 (resp. 1.2) is about when E has a positive (resp. negative) surface
occurrence of a large (resp. medium) molecule. Then, as we are going to see, replacing that molecule by a “safe” -conjunct
of it, corresponding to a smart environment’s possible move, yields a good formula H from H such that  E" =  H". This, by
(18), automatically means the CL9-provability of  E". The remaining Subcase 1.3 is about when all surface occurrences of
large (resp. medium) molecules in E are negative (resp. positive). This will be shown to imply that  E" follows from the
ﬂooriﬁcations of some elements of H by Wait for “the same reasons as” E follows from H.
Subcase 1.1: E has a positive surface occurrence of a large molecule Pˇunionsq , i.e., an occurrence of
Pˇ1unionsq  . . .  Pˇmunionsq .
Pick any a ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that neither the mediummolecule Pˇaunionsq nor any small molecule Pˇab (whatever b) have independent
occurrences in E. Such an a exists, for otherwise we would have at least m+ 1 independent occurrences of molecules in E
(including the occurrence of Pˇunionsq ), which violates Condition (i) of the deﬁnition of “goodness”. Let H be the result of replacing
in E the above occurrence of Pˇunionsq by Pˇaunionsq. Clearly H ∈ H. Observe that when transferring from E to H, we just “downsize” Pˇunionsq and
otherwise do not create any additional independent occurrences of molecules, so Condition (i) continues to be satisﬁed for
H. Neither do we introduce any new non-surface occurrences of molecules or any new independent occurrences of small
molecules, so Conditions (ii) and (iii) also continue to hold for H. And our choice of a obviously guarantees that so does
Condition (iv). To summarize, H is good. Therefore, by (18), CL9   H". Finally, note that, when ﬂoorifying a given formula,
both Pˇunionsq and Pˇaunionsq get replaced by the same atom P; and, as the only difference between E and H is that H has Pˇaunionsq where E has
Pˇunionsq , obviously  H" =  E". Thus, CL9   E".
Subcase 1.2: E has a negative surface occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇaunionsq—that is, an occurrence of
¬Pˇ1a  . . .  ¬Pˇma .
Pick any b such that E does not have an independent occurrence of Pˇa
b
. Again, in view of Condition (i), such a b exists. LetH be
the result of replacing in E the above occurrence of ¬Pˇ1a  . . .  ¬Pˇma by ¬Pˇab . Certainly H ∈ H. Conditions (i) and (ii) continue
to hold for H for the same reasons as in Subcase 1.1. In view of our choice of b, Condition (iii) is also inherited by H from E.
And so is Condition (iv), because H has the same positive occurrences of (the same) molecules as E does. Thus, H is good.
Therefore, by (18), CL9   H". It remains to show that  H" =  E". Note that when ﬂoorifying E, Pˇaunionsq gets replaced by P. But
so does Pˇa
b
when ﬂoorifying H because, by our choice of b, Pˇa
b
is an isolated small molecule of H. Since the only difference
between H and E is that H has Pˇa
b
where E has Pˇaunionsq, it is then obvious that indeed  H" =  E".
Subcase 1.3:Neither of the above two conditions is satisﬁed. Thismeans that in E all surface occurrences of largemolecules
are negative, and all surface occurrences of medium molecules are positive. Every such occurrence is an occurrence of a unionsq-
formula whose surface occurrences, as we remember, get replaced by ⊥ when transferring from E to ‖E‖; but the same
happens to the corresponding occurrences of ¬P or P in  E" when transferring from  E" to ‖ E"‖. Based on this observation,
with a little thought we can see that ‖ E"‖ is “almost the same” as ‖E‖; speciﬁcally, the only difference between these two
formulas is that ‖ E"‖ has⊥where ‖E‖ has isolated small molecules (positive or negative). Obviously this means that ‖ E"‖ is
a substitutional instance of ‖E‖—the result of substituting, in the latter, each positive isolated small molecule by ⊥ and the
atomic part (the part under ¬) of each negative isolated small molecule by . As E is derived by Wait, ‖E‖ is classically valid.
Therefore ‖ E"‖, as a substitutional instance of ‖E‖, is also classically valid. So, we have:
 E" is stable. (19)
Nowconsider an arbitrary formulaH′ that is the result of replacing in  E" a surface occurrence of a subformulaG′
1
 . . .  G′n
by G′
i
for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Our goal is to show that
17 Remember what was said earlier about the meaning of “negative occurrence” for small molecules.
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CL9  H′ (arbitrary H′ satisfying the above condition). (20)
The logical structure of E is the same as that of  E", with the only difference that, wherever  E" has general literals, E has
molecules. Hence E has an occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn where  E" has the above occurrence of G′1  . . .  G′n. Let
then H be the result of replacing G1  . . .  Gn by Gi in E. Of course H ∈ H. So, in view of (18), it would sufﬁce to show (in
order to verify (20)) that H is good and H′ =  H". Let us ﬁrst see that H is good. When transferring from E to H, Condition
(i) is inherited by H for the same or a similar reasons as in all of the previous cases. So is Condition (ii) because we are not
creating any new non-surface occurrences. Furthermore, notice that G1  . . .  Gn is not a molecule, for otherwise in  E" we
would have a general literal rather than G′
1
 . . .  G′n. Hence, in view of Condition (ii), Gi is not a small or mediummolecule.
This means that, when transferring from E to H, we are not creating new independent/surface occurrences of any small or
medium molecules, so that Conditions (iii) and (iv) are also inherited by H from E. To summarize, H is indeed good. Finally,
it is also rather obvious that H′ =  H". The only case when we might have H′ =  H" would be if there was a small molecule
Pˇa
b
isolated in E but not in H, or vice versa (so that the independent occurrence of that molecule in E would become P in  E"
and hence in H′ but stay Pˇa
b
in  H", or vice versa). But, as we observed just a little while ago, E and H do not differ in what
independent/surface occurrences of what small molecules they have.
Next, consider an arbitrary formulaH′′ that is the result of replacing in  E" a surface occurrence of a subformulaG′′
0
 . . .G′′n
by G′′
1
 . . .G′′n. Our goal is to show that
CL9  H′′ (arbitrary H′′ satisfying the above condition). (21)
This case is very similar to the case handled in the previous paragraph. The logical structure of E is the same as that of  E", so
E has an occurrence of a subformula G0 . . .Gn where  E" has the above occurrence of G′′0 . . .G′′n. Let then H be the result
of replacing G0 . . .Gn by G1 . . .Gn in E. Of course H ∈ H. Continuing arguing as in the previous paragraph, we ﬁnd that
H is good and that H′′ =  H", which, by (18), implies the desired (21).
Based on (19), (20) and (21), we ﬁnd that  E" is derivable in CL9 by Wait.
The remaining two Cases 2 and 3 are about when E is derived by Choose or Switch from a premise H. Such an H turns out
to be good and hence (by the induction hypothesis) its ﬂooriﬁcation CL9-provable. And, “almost always”  E" follows from
 H" by Choose or Switch for the same reasons as E follows from H. An exception is the special case of Choose when H is the
result of replacing in E a positive occurrence of a medium molecule Pˇaunionsq by one of its disjuncts Pˇab such that E has a negative
independent occurrence of Pˇa
b
. Using our earlier terms, this is a step signifying’s (ﬁnal) decision to “match” the two P-based
molecules. In this case, while  E" does not follow from  H" by Choose, it does so byMatch. The secret is that the two P-based
molecules are non-isolated small molecules in H and hence remain elementary literals in  H", while they turn into general
literals in  E".
Case 2: E is derived by Choose. That is, we have CL10  H, where H is the result of replacing in E a surface occurrence of a
subformula G = G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Fix these formulas and this number i. Just as in Case 1 (statement
(18)), based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL9   H". (22)
We need to consider the following three subcases that cover all possibilities:
Subcase 2.1: G is not a molecule. Reasoning (almost) exactly as we did at the end of our discussion of Subcase 1.3, we ﬁnd
that H is good. Therefore, by (22), CL9   H". Now, a little thought can convince us that  E" follows from  H" by Choose, so
that CL9   E".
Subcase 2.2: G is a negative large molecule ¬Pˇ1unionsq unionsq . . . unionsq ¬Pˇmunionsq . So, Gi = ¬Pˇiunionsq. A (now already routine for us) examination of
Conditions (i)-(iv) reveals that each of these four conditions are inherited by H from E, so that H is good. Therefore, by (22),
CL9   H". Now,  H" can be easily seen to be the same as  E", and thus CL9   E".
Subcase 2.3: G is a positive medium molecule Pˇa
1
unionsq . . . unionsq Pˇam. So, Gi = Pˇai . There are two subsubcases to consider:
Subsubcase 2.3.1: E contains no independent occurrence of Pˇa
i
. One can easily verify that H is good and that  H" =  E". By
(22), we then get the desired CL9   E".
Subsubcase2.3.2: E hasan independentoccurrenceof Pˇa
i
. SinceE alsohasapositive independentoccurrenceof Pˇaunionsq, Condition
(iv) implies that the above occurrence of Pˇa
i
in E is negative. This, in conjunction with Condition (iii), means that E does not
have any other independent occurrences of Pˇa
i
, and thus H has exactly two—one negative and one positive—independent
occurrences of Pˇa
i
. This guarantees that Condition (iii) is satisﬁed for H, because H and E only differ in that H has Pˇa
i
where
E has Pˇaunionsq. Conditions (i) and (ii) are straightforwardly inherited by H from E. Finally, Condition (iv) also transfers from E to
H because, even though H—unlike E—has a positive independent occurrence of Pˇa
i
, it no longer has a positive independent
occurrence of Pˇaunionsq (which, by the same Condition (iv) for E, was unique in E). Thus, H is good and, by (22), CL9   H". Note
that since H is good, by Condition (ii), both of the independent occurrences of Pˇa
i
in it are surface occurrences. The same,
of course, is true for the corresponding occurrences of Pˇa
i
and Pˇaunionsq in E. Let us now compare  E" with  H". According to our
earlier observation, Pˇa
i
only has one independent occurrence in E, i.e., Pˇa
i
is E-isolated. Hence the independent occurrence
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of Pˇa
i
, just as that of Pˇaunionsq, gets replaced by P when ﬂoorifying E. On the other hand, Pˇai is no longer isolated in H, so the two
independent occurrences of it stay as they are when ﬂoorifying H. Based on this observation, we can easily see that the only
difference between  E" and  H" is that  E" has the general atom P where  H" has the (two occurrences of) elementary atom
Pˇa
i
. Since  E" does not contain Pˇa
i
(because the only independent occurrence of it in E, as well as all large andmedium P-based
molecules, got replaced by P when ﬂoorifying E), and sincewe are talking about two—one positive and one negative—surface
occurrences of P in  E", we ﬁnd that  E" follows from  H" by Match. We already know that CL9   H". Hence CL9   E".
Case 3: E is derived by Switch. That is, we have CL10  H, where H is the result of replacing in E a surface occurrence of a
subformula G0 . . .Gk by G1 . . .Gk. Just as in Cases 1 and 2, based on the induction hypothesis, we have:
If H is good, then CL9   H". (23)
Reasoning as in the previous cases, we further ﬁnd that H is good, and thus, by (23), CL9   H". Now, a moment’s thought
convinces us that  E" follows from  H" by Switch, so that CL9   E".
Claim 1 is proven.
Now we are very close to ﬁnishing our proof of Lemma 9.1. Assume CL9  F . Let F be the result of replacing in F all
occurrences of each general atom P ∈ P by Pˇunionsq . Obviously F is good. Clearly we also have  F" = F , so that CL9   F".
Therefore, by Claim 1, CL10  F. Hence, by Lemma 8.6, there is an interpretation † that interprets every elementary atom
as a ﬁnitary predicate of arithmetical complexity 2, such that
F† is not computable. (24)
Let * be an interpretation such that:
• * agrees with † on all elementary atoms;
• * interprets each atom P ∈ P as (Pˇunionsqunionsq )†.
Clearly * interprets atoms as promised in our Lemma 9.1. It is also obvious that F* = F†. Therefore, by (24), F* is not
computable, and the lemma is proven. 
10. A ﬁrst-order extension of CL9
Here we introduce a ﬁrst-order extension of CL9 called CL11. The latter is also a conservative extension of logic CL4
(proven to be sound and complete in [12]), obtained by augmenting its language with ,.
For each arity n, the language of CL11 has inﬁnitely many non-logical n-ary elementary letters p, q, …and general letters P,
Q , …. An elementary atom is p(t1, . . . ,tn), where p is an n-ary elementary letter and each ti is a term (a variable or a constant).
General atoms are deﬁned similarly. As in the case of CL9, each interpretation * is required to interpret elementary atoms as
elementary games, andgeneral atomsas any static games. Such an interpretation * then extends to all formulas by commuting
with the operation of substitution of variables by terms, and seeing all logical operators as the corresponding operations
on games. There are some straightforward additional “admissibility” conditions on interpretations to avoid collisions of
variables and some other unpleasant effects. We refer for details to [16] or [12].
The logical vocabulary of CL11 is that of CL9 plus the four quantiﬁers ,unionsq,∀,∃. Formulas, that we refer to as CL11-
formulas, are built from atoms, variables, constants and logical operators in the standardway. As before, negation is ofﬁcially
allowed to be applied only to non-logical atoms. For safety, we also require that no variable should have both free and bound
occurrences in the same formula. The concepts of validity and uniform validity straightforwardly extend from CL9-formulas
to CL11-formulas. So do most of the technical concepts deﬁned earlier for the language of CL9. Two of those still need to be
slightly redeﬁned. Namely, a surface occurrence now is an occurrence that is not in the scope of a choice connective or a
choice quantiﬁer and is not in the tail of any sequential subformula. And the elementarization of a formula F now means
the result of replacing in the capitalization of F every surface occurrence of the form G1  . . .  Gn orxG by, every surface
occurrence of the form G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn orunionsqxG by ⊥, and every positive surface occurrence of each general literal by ⊥. Finally,
a formula is said to be stable iff its elementarization is a valid formula of classical ﬁrst-order logic; otherwise it is instable.
In the above language, the logic is axiomatized as follows:
Deﬁnition 10.1. The rules of inference of CL11 are:
Wait: H  F , where F is stable and H is a set of formulas satisfying the following three conditions:
• whenever F has a surface occurrence of a subformula G1  . . .  Gn, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the result of
replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
• whenever F hasa surfaceoccurrenceof a subformulaG0G1 . . .Gn, H contains the result of replacing thatoccurrence
in F by G1 . . .Gn;
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• whenever F has a surface occurrence of a subformulaxG(x), H contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F
by G(y), where y is a variable not occurring in F .
unionsq-Choose: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F a surface occurrence of a subformula G1 unionsq . . . unionsq Gn by Gi for some
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.unionsq-Choose: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F a surface occurrence of a subformulaunionsqxG(x) by G(t), where t is a
term with no bound occurrence in F .
Switch: H  F , whereH is the result of replacing in F a surface occurrence of a subformula G0G1 . . .Gn by G1 . . .Gn.
Match: H  F , where H is the result of replacing in F two—one positive and one negative — surface occurrences of some
n-ary general letter P by an n-ary non-logical elementary letter p that does not occur in F .
There is every reason to expect that the already known soundness and completeness theorems for CL9 and CL4 extend
to their common extension CL11. A proof of this fact can be obtained by combining the techniques and ideas employed
in the above two soundness/completeness proofs. The author does not see any reasons why such an (almost mechanical)
combination would not work. This job has to be actually done though, and until then the following statement should be
ofﬁcially considered only a conjecture rather than a theorem.
Conjecture 10.2. CL11  F iff F is valid (any CL11-formula F). Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes a CL11-proof of an arbitrary formula F and constructs an HPM H such that, for
every interpretation *, H computes F*.
(b) IfCL11  F, then F* is not computable for some interpretation * that interprets all elementary atoms of F as ﬁnitary predicates
of arithmetical complexity2, and interprets all general atoms of F as problems of the form (A
1
1
unionsq . . . unionsq A1m)  . . .  (Am1 unionsq . . . unionsq Amm),
where each A
j
i
is a ﬁnitary predicate of arithmetical complexity 2.
Theorem 10.3. The ∀,∃-free fragment of CL11 (i.e., the set of all ∀,∃-free theorems of CL11) is decidable in polynomial space.
Proof. This is similar to the corresponding theorem for CL4 proven in [12]—the presence of , in formulas hardly
creates any differences. So, it would be sufﬁcient to give just a schematic outline of the proof idea for our present theorem. A
polynomial-space decision algorithm forCL11-provability of a∀,∃-free formula F is a recursive one. At each level of recursion,
it tests all possible premises (for any of the ﬁve possible rules) for F , calling itself on those premises. In each case, there is
only a ﬁnite number of premises to test. Strictly speaking, there are inﬁnitely many possible premises for Match. However,
those premises only differ from each other in selecting a fresh elementary letter to replace two occurrences of a general
letter. Of course, one choice of such a letter can yield a provable premise iff any other choice can, so considering only one
premise would be sufﬁcient. Similarly for the rules associated with andunionsq (-Choose andWait). Each time the algorithm
deals with Wait, it has to test whether the conclusion is stable. While stability of CL11-formulas is generally undecidable,
for ∀,∃-free CL11-formulas it can be easily seen to be decidable in linear space. Each level of recursion thus only takes
polynomial space. And the depth of recursion is limited by the size of the formula. So, thewhole algorithm runs in polynomial
space. 
We close this section with two examples that can help us get some syntactic feel of CL11 and appreciate its value as a
problem-solving tool.
Example 10.4. Remember formula (5), claimed to be valid in Section 2.7. Below is a CL11-proof of it:
1. ¬q(y) ∨ P(y) ∨ q(y) (from {} by Wait)
2. ¬q(y) ∨
(
¬p(y)P(y)
)
∨ q(y) (from {1} by Wait)
3. ¬P(y) ∨
(
¬p(y)P(y)
)
∨ P(y) (from 2 by Match)
4. ¬P(y) ∨
(
¬p(y)P(y)
)
∨
(
P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)
)
(from 3 by unionsq-choose)
5. ¬P(y) ∨ q(y) ∨ ¬q(y) (from {} by Wait)
6.
(
p(y)¬P(y)
)
∨ q(y) ∨ ¬q(y) (from {5} by Wait)
7.
(
p(y)¬P(y)
)
∨ P(y) ∨ ¬P(y) (from 6 by Match)
8.
(
p(y)¬P(y)
)
∨ P(y) ∨
(
P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)
)
(from 7 by unionsq-Choose)
9.
(
p(y)¬P(y)
)
∨
(
¬p(y)P(y)
)
∨
(
P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)
)
(from {4,8} by Wait)
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10.
(
P(y)¬P(y)
)
∨
(
¬P(y)P(y)
)
∨
(
P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)
)
(from 9 by Match)
11.
(
P(y)¬P(y)
)
∨unionsqx(¬P(x)P(x)) ∨ (P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)) (from 10 byunionsq-Choose)
12.unionsqx(P(x)¬P(x)) ∨unionsqx(¬P(x)P(x)) ∨ (P(y) unionsq ¬P(y)) (from 11 byunionsq-Choose)
13.unionsqx(P(x)¬P(x)) ∨unionsqx(¬P(x)P(x)) ∨x(P(x) unionsq ¬P(x)) (from {12} by Wait)
Example 10.5. Let us now see the CL11-provability of formula (6) from Section 2.7. Below E ↔ F is an abbreviation of
¬(E ↔ F), i.e., of (E ∧ ¬F) ∨ (F ∧ ¬E):
1.
(
q(z) ↔ p(v)
)
∨ ¬p(v) ∨ q(z) (from {} by Wait)
2.
(
q(z) ↔ p(v)
)
∨ ¬p(v) ∨
(
¬q(z)q(z)
)
(from 1 by Switch)
3.
(
q(z) ↔ p(v)
)
∨
(
p(v)¬p(v)
)
∨
(
¬q(z)q(z)
)
(from {2} by Wait)
4.
(
q(z) ↔ p(v)
)
∨unionsqx(p(x)¬p(x)) ∨ (¬q(z)q(z)) (from 3 byunionsq-Choose)
5.y(q(z) ↔ p(y)) ∨unionsqx(p(x)¬p(x)) ∨ (¬q(z)q(z)) (from {4} by Wait)
6.unionsqxy(q(x) ↔ p(y)) ∨unionsqx(p(x)¬p(x)) ∨ (¬q(z)q(z)) (from 5 byunionsq-Choose)
7.unionsqxy(q(x) ↔ p(y)) ∨unionsqx(p(x)¬p(x)) ∨x(¬q(x)q(x)) (from {6} by Wait)
Appendix
A. On abstract resource semantics
Abstract resource semantics, introduced in [9], is a companion of computability logic. One could probably characterize it
as a “lazy” and naive form of the semantics of CL. Here we outline it in very informal terms.
All rules of our systems—CL9, CL9◦, CL11—pretty much look like (the effects of) moves in associated games. The only
exception is Match, which has no direct counterpart in games. The central idea of abstract resource semantics is to make
Match a legitimate move (by ) in its own right, called allocation. [9] provided plenty of intuitive explanations, showing
how this sort of an approach yields a direct materialization of the resource intuitions traditionally (and somewhat wrongly)
associated with linear logic, in the “can you get both a candy and an ice cream for one dollar?” style.
The language that abstract resource semantics dealswith is the same as the language of computability logic (possiblywith
just minor differences such as considering hyperformulas instead of formulas), with two sorts—elementary and general—of
atoms. And, as in computability logic, formulas are understood as games. There are three main differences.
One, rather minor, difference is that abstract resource semantics prefers to see each position not as a sequence of moves
but rather the formula—more precisely, the hyperformula—representing the game to which such a sequence brings the
original game down. This is an approach taken in all pre-CL papers by the present author, most notably in [4]. For example,
the position 〈1.2〉 of game
(
P unionsq (QR)
)
∧ Swill be simply seen as the hyperformula (QR) ∧ S, and themove 1.2 by as the
action of turning
(
P unionsq (QR)
)
∧ S into (QR) ∧ S. The further move 1.§ by⊥will be seen as turning (QR) ∧ S into (QR) ∧ S,
the further move 1.§ by  will be seen as turning (QR) ∧ S into R ∧ S, etc.18
The second difference is that, while computability logic treats formulas as schemata of games—that is, syntactic expres-
sions that become games only after an interpretation * is applied to them—abstract resource semantics simply sees formulas
as full-ﬂedged games (“abstract resources”). It does not apply or appeal to interpretations, essentially meaning that it has a
concept of validity but no concept of truth.
The third,most important difference, as already noted, is that, alongwith all “ordinary”moves permitted in computability
logic, abstract resource semantics allows an additional sort of a move called (resource) allocation. It consists of pairing one
positive and one negative occurrence of a general atom P. The effect of such a move can be stipulated to be the result of
replacing, in the original formula, the two occurrences of P by the hybrid atom Pq for some fresh elementary atom q. That
is, allocation is a direct counterpart of (or the same as) Match—or, more precisely, Match◦. If no recurrence operators and
18 Note the minor difference from how we treated catch-up switch moves in Section 6: such moves had no effect there, and (QR) ∧ S would remain
(QR) ∧ S instead of turning into R ∧ S.
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no parallel and sequential quantiﬁers are present, every game will only last a ﬁnite number of steps, and will be considered
won by  iff the ﬁnal formula/position is stable. It is almost immediately obvious (only for an expert, of course) that our
systems CL9 and CL11 continue to be sound and complete with respect this semantics. In fact, proving such soundness and
completeness would be by an order of magnitude easier than proving soundness and completeness with respect to the
semantics of CL, because the relevant parts of abstract resource semantics are essentially directly “read” from the rules of
those systems.
The above approach easily extends to the fragment of the language of CL containing parallel and sequential recurrences, as
well as all sorts of quantiﬁers. The only difference will be that now the “ﬁnal” (“limit”) formula, whose stability determines
the outcome of the game, may be inﬁnite, containing inﬁnite parallel conjunctions and/or disjunctions. Furthermore, a
sequential subformula of the “ﬁnal” formula may have no particular underlined component due to an inﬁnite number of
leading switches made in it. Such a subformula should be replaced by ⊥ (if it was a ,  or −∨| -subformula) or  (if it was a
, or −∧| -subformula). Then extending the concept of stability to such limit formulas presents no problem.
A relatively non-trivial step is further extending the approach to branching recurrences as well. Those familiar with the
relevant pieces of literature (such as Section 4.6 of [16]) would remember that the effect of making a “replicative move” in
◦| E or ◦| E is turning it into ◦| (E ◦ E) or ◦| (E ◦ E), respectively. Adding ◦ to the language that we consider is not necessary though,
as ◦| (A ◦ B) is equivalent to ◦| A ∧ ◦| B and ◦| (A ◦ B) is equivalent to ◦| A ∨ ◦| B. So, we can stipulate that a replicative move turns
◦| E into ◦| E ∧ ◦| E and ◦| E into ◦| E ∨ ◦| E. And the effect of a non-replicative move α within ◦| E or ◦| E is simply replacing E by the
effect of α on E. In this respect, branching operators do not differ from any other operators.Whatmakes the case of branching
operators special is that general atoms that are in the scope of such operators will have to be reallocated over and over again
(as the associated replicative moves create two copies of the argument of ◦| ,◦| ). Reallocations here should follow the same
constraint as all allocations do—speciﬁcally, (re)allocation can only take place between a positive and a negative occurrence
of the same atom, whether such an atom is an original general atom P or a previously already allocated atom which now
looks like Pq. When two occurrences of such a Pq are allocated to each other, they become Pq,r for some fresh r. Thus, here
we may get an inﬁnite “ﬁnal” formula not only because of inﬁnitely many subformulas, but also because of hybrid atoms Ps
with inﬁnite subscripts s. Two such atoms Pp and Qq counting as the same iff P = Q and p = q, the concept of stability then
painlessly extends to the present case as well.
The approach called the logic of tasks, introduced and elaborated in [4], was essentially nothing but the above-outlined
abstract resource semantics limited to the language of (not yet ofﬁcially born) CL without general atoms and without
branching and sequential operators. In the absence of general atoms, the logic of tasks did not employ allocation. On the
other hand, [9] dealt with a language with general atoms and used allocation as a basic semantical concept. But the logical
vocabulary for which abstract resource semantics was fully deﬁned (and, most importantly, well-motivated intuitively) was
limited to {¬, ∧ ,∨}. The extension of abstract resource semantics to the full language of CL outlined in the present appendix
is a mechanical combination of the approaches of [9] and [4], extended further to the sequential and branching operators
that were present in neither [9] nor [4].
Both [4] and [9] outlined potential applications of abstract resource semantics in resource-based planning systems. It has
been also argued that planning systems based on such a semantics are immune to the notorious frame problem and the
knowledge preconditions problem. That outline still needs a further materialization and elaboration though. Until that is
done, abstract resource semantics (unlike the semantics of CL) should probably be treated as a technical tool rather than a
semantics in its own right. As such, it may be very useful in proving various theorems about computability logic.
B. Proof of Theorem 4.4
Lemma B.1
1. Assume A0, . . . ,An are constant static games,  is a ℘-delay of , and  is a ℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An. Then  is also a
℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An.
2. Similarly for A0A1A2 . . . .
Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction on the length of the shortest illegal initial segment of .
Clause 1. Assume the conditions of clause 1 of the lemma. We want to show that  is a ℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An. Let
〈,℘α〉 be the shortest (℘-) illegal initial segment of . Let 〈,℘α〉 be the shortest initial segment of  containing all the
℘-labeled moves19 of 〈,℘α〉. If  is a ℘-illegal position of A0 . . .An, then so is  and we are done. Therefore, for the rest
of the proof, we assume that
 is not a ℘-illegal position of A0 . . .An. (B.1)
Let  be the sequence of those ¬℘-labeled moves of  that are not in . Obviously
〈,℘α〉 is a ℘-delay of 〈,℘α,〉. (B.2)
19 In this context, different occurrences of the same labmove count as different labmoves. So, a more accurate phrasing would be “as many ℘-labeled
moves as...” instead “all the ℘-labeled moves of ...”.
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We also claim that
 is a legal position of A0 . . .An. (B.3)
Indeed, suppose this was not the case. Then, by (B.1),  should be ¬℘-illegal. This would make  a ¬℘-illegal run of
A0 . . .An with  as an illegal initial segment which is shorter than 〈,℘α〉. Then, by the induction hypothesis, any run for
which  is a ¬℘-delay, would be ¬℘-illegal. But, as observed in Lemma 4.6 of [5], the fact that  is a ℘-delay of  implies
that  is a ¬℘-delay of . So,  would be ¬℘-illegal, which is a contradiction because, according to our assumption,  is
℘-illegal.
We are continuing our proof. There are three possible reasons to why 〈,℘α〉 is an illegal (while  being legal) position
of A0 . . .An:
Reason 1: α does not have the form § or .β. Then, in view of (B.3), 〈,℘α〉 is a ℘-illegal position of A0 . . .An. As 〈,℘α〉
happens to be an initial segment of , the latter then is a ℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An.
Reason 2: α = §, and either ℘ = ⊥ and the ⊥-degree of  is n, or ℘ =  and the -degree of  equals the ⊥-degree of .
In either case, with (B.3) in mind, 〈,℘α〉 can be seen to be a ℘-illegal position of A0 . . .An. Hence, as 〈,℘α〉 is an initial
segment of , the latter is a ℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An.
Reason 3: α = .β, the ℘-degree of ℘α is i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, and 〈#i,℘β〉 ∈ LrAi . That is, 〈,℘α〉#i is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. (B.2)
obviously implies that 〈,℘α〉#i is a ℘-delay of 〈,℘α,〉#i. Therefore, since Ai is static, clause 1 of Lemma 6.6 yields that
〈,℘α,〉#i is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. Notice that 〈,℘α,〉#i = 〈#i,℘β,#i〉. A ℘-illegal position will remain ℘-illegal after
removing a block of ¬℘-labeled moves (in particular, #i) at the end of it. Hence, 〈#i,℘β〉 is a ℘-illegal position of Ai. In
view of (B.3), this implies that 〈,℘α = ℘.β〉 ∈ LrA0...An , so that 〈,℘α〉 is a ℘-illegal position of A0 . . .An, and then so is
 because 〈,℘α〉 is an initial segment of it.
Clause 2. The reasoning here is virtually the same as in the proof of clause 1. The only difference (that makes the present
case simpler) is that, in “Reason 2”, the condition “℘ = ⊥ and the ⊥-degree of  is n” does not need to be considered. 
Sincex,x,−∧| ,−∨| are nothing but sequential conjunctions/disjunctions, there is no need to separately consider themwhen
proving Theorem 4.4. Furthermore, since  is expressible in terms of  and ¬ (with ¬ already known to preserve the static
property), considering only  would be sufﬁcient. For simplicity, here we restrict ourselves to the n-ary case of . Adapting
our argument to the inﬁnite case of  does not present a problem.
Assume that A0, . . . , An are static constant games, Wn
A0...An 〈〉 = ℘ and  is a ℘-delay of . Our goal is to show that
WnA0...An 〈〉 = ℘.
If  is a ¬℘-illegal run of A0 . . .An, then it is won by ℘ and we are done. So, assume that  is not ¬℘-illegal. Lemma
4.6 of [5] asserts that, if  is a ℘-delay of , then  is a ¬℘-delay of . So, by Lemma B.1, our  cannot be ¬℘-illegal, for
otherwise so would be .  also cannot be ℘-illegal, because otherwise it would not be won by ℘. Consequently,  cannot
be ℘-illegal either, for otherwise, by Lemma B.1,  would be ℘-illegal. Thus, we have narrowed down our considerations to
the case when both  and  are legal runs of A0 . . .An.
WnA0...An 〈〉 = ℘, together with  ∈ LrA0...An , implies that, where i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is the⊥-degree of , #i is a ℘-won run
of Ai. Taking into account that 
#i is obviously a ℘-delay of #i and that Ai is static, the above, in turn, implies that 
#i is a
℘-won run of Ai, which, taking into account that  ∈ LrA0...An , means nothing but that  is a ℘-won run of A0 . . .An.
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